Daily Report

East Europe

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Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-153 *7 August 1996*

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Balkans: Milosevic, Tudjman Meet for Talks in Athens

LD0708101296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0839 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Athens, Aug. 7 (TANJUG)—Presidents Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, who met here Wednesday morning, are discussing possibilities for the promotion of relations between Yugoslavia and Croatia.

The host, Greek Prime Minister Konstandinos Simitis, welcomed President Milosevic at the approach to the Vouliagmeni resort, where the meeting is held.

Simitis (?is) to attend the opening of the talks, as earlier announced.

Milosevic and Tudjman are discussing possibilities for the promotion of initial steps in economic cooperation, steps which have produced good results, including the opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway and the establishment of cooperation between the oil industries of Yugoslavia and Croatia.

The two presidents will discuss also the normalization of political relations, conditions for which Croatia has to meet under the Dayton Accords.

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Albania: Press Comments on Christopher's 'Disappointment'

AU0708083996

[FBIS Report] The Albanian press on 2 and 3 August comments extensively on Secretary of State Christopher's 1 August statement to Congress, in reply to questions by Congressmen Lantos and Engel, in which he expressed "disappointment" at political trends in Albania.

The progovernment papers Tirana ALBANIA and RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian on 2 August both carry without comment the text of Mr. Christopher's reply at the bottom of their first pages, under the same headline, "U.S. Interest in the Consolidation of Democracy in Albania."

The Socialist Party's [PS] Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian on 2 August carries the text of Mr. Christopher's reply to Congressman Lantos at the top of its first page, under the headline "We Share Your Disappointment," and also carries on page three a 1,000-word commentary by Hamdi Jupe, entitled "Another U.S. Stand on the Elections in Albania." Jupe writes, "The U.S. concern, consistently repeated during the last few days, has been crystallized by Mr. Christopher in four main forms. First, the U.S. Government is worried at authoritarian trends in Albania. This is a matter of a range of shortcomings in Albanian democracy such as freedom of the press, the independence of the judiciary, the rights of national minorities, etc. Mr. Perina, deputy U.S. assistant secretary of state, raised the U.S. Government's criticisms of the development of democracy in Albania at a different Congressional hearing. The fact that Mr. Christopher has emphasized once more his concern over this issue shows that this is not a matter of 'the influence of some foreign lobby' on U.S. Government policy, as Tirana's refrain following U.S. criticisms has run, but is a consistent official stand by the United States regarding the development of democracy in Albania. Mr. Christopher's words, 'The steps toward democracy have not been as firm as they should have been,' are a final U.S. assessment of the four years of the Democratic Party's [PD] government."

Jupe continues, "The United States is asking for new parliamentary elections, which must be held under guaranteed free and fair conditions. These conditions are now well known: the creation of a climate of trust with the aid of dialogue; the approval of a democratic electoral law; and the other conditions outlined in the resolutions of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the repeated declarations by the U.S. State Department. This is the import of Mr. Christopher's words about 'reviewing aspects of the elections.'

"Will Albania's official policy respond to the latest U.S. stand regarding the problem of the elections and other questions of democracy in Albania? Our government might again behave as if it has not heard Mr. Christopher's latest statement. But it can no longer hide the concern of the U.S. Government and the public about what is happening in Albania and especially the problem of the elections. After Mr. Christopher's statement, President Clinton is the only U.S. official who has not spoken out on the Albanian elections. Are the rulers of Albania waiting to hear the demand for new elections from his own lips? The megalomania and political confusion into which they have fallen could lead them into political adventures. However, there is no reason why the Albanian people should suffer the consequences of the attitude of one or a handful of Albanian politicians toward the world's greatest democracy. After the EU, the United States is Albania's main economic support. But the loss of economic aid as a result of a deterioration of relations between the two countries would also be accompanied by a political defeat in the eyes of the world.

"For its part, the PS has always welcomed the U.S.'s consistent stand regarding the 26 May elections. The most recent statement by the party presidium expressed the party's willingness to work together with the other Albanian political parties in order to solve the crisis on the basis of the U.S. recommendations."

The Center Pole's paper Tirana POLI I QENDRES in Albanian on 2 August carries on page three a 500-word commentary by B. Morina under the headline, "Christopher: I Am Disappointed With the 26 May Elections." The commentary concludes, "Warren Christopher's statements to Congress are doubtless the clearest warning signal that Washington has sent in Albania's direction. They have been issued for those who have ears to hear, and the government is not the best place to employ the deaf."

Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian on 2 August carries on page three an 800-word commentary by Gavrosh Levonja entitled, "Is $200 Million the Price of Power?"

Levonja writes that Christopher's comments were intended "to once again tweak Tirana's ear," and continues:

"The old Albania-hand Tom Lantos, the first U.S. politician to set foot in our country even before the fall of communism, also expressed concern about authoritarian trends in Albania, threats to press freedom, and the independence of the judiciary. He mentioned the sum

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of $200 million spent on Albania by the U.S. Government, a sum of which the Albanian public has not been informed up till now. The mention of this sum, which is not inconsiderable, implies that it will not be surprising if the U.S. Government uses economic pressure to put the development of democracy back on track.

Levonja continues, "Christopher's assessment that 'The steps toward democracy have not been as firm as they should have been' is also a cold shower for those who direct the Albanian state, who base their propaganda both at home and abroad on the notion of democracy."

Levonja concludes, "The determined stand by the United States on the elections allows one to suspect that other means will be used if criticism and advice have no effect. Experience so far suggests that the United States uses all the means at its disposal to make a reality of what it says. However, remembering the statement by Mr. Nicholas Burns, made at the time when EU Commissioner Van Den Broek was visiting Tirana, there is also a possibility that this unswerving stance is not only aimed at Tirana. Burns's statement might also have been a signal to the EU commissioner, and therefore to Europe, to be careful before easing its stand toward the Tirana Government."

Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian on 3 August carries on page three an 800-word item compiled by Rezear Xhaxhiu consisting of statements by six representatives of political parties, under the headline "Politicians Comment on 'the Christopher Thunderbolt.'"

Ali Spahia of the PD is quoted as saying, "I think that, by attentively following the developments that are really taking place in Albania, the United States will be persuaded that the elections were genuine and fair. I think that we will in the future provide further proof to really persuade the United States of our position. We confirmed this at the second round and during the reelections. I do not think the future of our relations will be compromised, because we consider them a matter of priority. I am personally convinced that Washington will soon come to understand our position. It is not in the interest of either country for our relations to cool, bearing in mind our mutual interests. I am convinced that both Tirana and the United States are interested in a solid democracy and in political stability in Albania. I assure you that we will give extensive proof that we genuinely support the normal progress of processes that are now irreversible."

Namik Dokle of the PS, Skender Gjinushi of the Social-Democratic Party, and Arben Imami of the Democratic Alliance give an unequivocal welcome to Christopher's statement.

Dokle is quoted as saying, "I think that the most recent U.S. stand will have a positive influence on the course of Albanian politics, even though Berisha is trying to play deaf while the alarm bells throughout the world are sounding."

Gjinushi is quoted as saying, "Christopher's statement is more than clear. When elections are declared illegitimate, this means that the government issuing from them is illegitimate."

Imami is quoted as saying, "There is nothing left for the Tirana Government to do except to reflect seriously on the U.S.'s attitude, which is indeed compromising for a state that thinks it is advancing toward U.S.-style democracy."

Vasil Melo, chairman of the Human Rights Union, is quoted as saying, "I think that Christopher's position is a diplomatic attitude more than an official U.S. position. In front of a body such as the U.S. Congress, the secretary of state is obliged to adopt such a diplomatic attitude. In fact a kind of misunderstanding has arisen between our two countries, which I personally am not pleased about, because both as a politician and as a citizen I would rather not have such problems with a country that has given us significant support in the last few years."

Sabri Godo, chairman of the Republican Party, is quoted as saying, "There is no question of a definite stand by the U.S. Administration. We must remember one thing: The ordinary American is very sensitive about every single free vote. He tells himself 10 times a day that he lives in a free and democratic country. This is deeply instilled into him. When he sees that something is amiss according to his principles, he reacts, at all levels." Godo concludes, "I think there is now only one solution, to enter into serious dialogue with the United States and to listen to what the United States suggests to us. This would be a way to settle what is happening now between Tirana and the United States."

Albania: Peacekeeping Unit Returns From Training in Germany

AU0608185596 Tirana ATA in English 0947 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 5 (ATA)—Albanian peace keeping company, returned from Germany after successfully finishing a month of final preparations sponsored by Bundeswehr.

Germany, one of Albania's most important friends, alongside the concrete aid in the military field and special measures in preparation of military exercises "Mati

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'96" is offering an all-round support in preparation and completion of Albanian peace keeping forces.

Albanian forces seriously valuated this new mission of the Albanian Army and with the German forces were intensively and professionally prepared. The troops were inspected by the chief of German Staff of Infantry Forces, Lieutenant General Willman and later by vice chief of the Albanian Army General Staff, Major General Armand Vincani.

Albania: FYROM Envoy Protests Parliament Resolution

LD0608222796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2218 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, August 6 (TANJUG)—Macedonian [the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] Ambassador in Tirana Nikola Todorcevski filed a protest note at the Albanian Foreign Ministry Tuesday expressing dissatisfaction with a resolution by Albanian parliament to back the illegal ethnic Albanian University in Tetovo, a town in western Macedonia.

The protest note said that Albania's move would not contribute to goodneighbourly relations and would affect stability in the entire region, the Macedonian government said in a statement released here on Tuesday.

The note also said that the realization of rights by minorities in Macedonia, including the ethnic Albanian minority, surpassed international standards.

After a series of protests staged in several Macedonian towns by militant ethnic Albanians who rallied around radical parties of the National Bloc, Albania's parliament passed a resolution on July 30 demanding the Macedonian government to respect the right of ethnic Albanians to higher education in their mother tongue.

Under the Macedonian constitution, education in mother tongue for minorities is guaranteed only in primary and secondary schools.

The "chancellor" of the Tetovo illegal university, Fadilj Sulejmani, and four of his associates have been in prison since late July serving sentences for incidents caused while attempting to open an university in Tetovo.

Albania: Reaction to Appointment of Greek Bishops

AU0608202296 Tirana ATA in English 1110 GMT 6 Aug 96

[Report by R. Floqi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 5 (ATA)—The General Council of the Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church fully agreed to the views of Archbishop Anastassios Iannulatos put forward to the Oecumenical Patriarchate through two letters regarding the ordainment by the Oecumenical Patriarchate of three bishops for the Albanian Orthodox Autocephalous Church.

The Press Office of the Albanian Orthodox Autocephalous Church in a clarification "in order to avoid misinterpretations" says that Anastassios was urgently summoned to the Oecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul to carry the ordainment on July 22, 1996. But, after analysing the specific conditions and numerous difficulties, Iannulatos said a day later that:

"Fear and concerns have now been intensified in Albania that the Greeks tend to penetrate and realise their ethnic plans through the Albanian Orthodox Autocephalous Church."

Iannulatos refers to the "clear cut reaction" of President of the Republic Sali Berisha after the election of Archbishop Iannulatos. Berisha "in his meeting with the patriarchate's delegation in 1992 clearly said that: 'The Albanian Government will accept no other Greek bishops and counter-proposed that 'bishops of some other citizenship be sought.'"

The committee for the defence of autocephaly of the Albanian Orthodox Church on August 1st launched a protest to Istanbul Oecumenical Patriarchate Fanari, to Patriarch Bartholomew, against the nomination of three Greek bishops as metropolitans of Gjirokaster, Vlore, and Korce.

"The Orthodox believers and the all the Albanian people consider this act ominous and interference into the home affairs of the Albanian Orthodox Autocephalous Church," the protest says.

The letter the representative of the Albanian Government, Bardhyl Fico, handed over on August 2, 1996 to the archbishop of the Albanian Orthodox Autocephalous Church, Anastassios Iannulatos, says: "We are surprised at the fact that the Patriarchate, without a preliminary talk with Albanian Government representatives, takes the decision that the whole Synod be composed of Greeks.

"This not only goes beyond any ethics of relations between sides, and at the same time jars into the national consciousness of our people, also including the Albanian Orthodox.

"Please, Your Holiness, make known our firm stand not to allow any foreign clergy to run the religion affairs in Albania."

The letter of the Albanian Government stressed that this approach has nothing to do whatsoever with the friendship between the Albanian and Greek peoples.

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Also the Albanian Orthodox Autocephalous Church says in its explanation that Iannulatos has said in his letters to Istanbul's Patriarchate that: "If the Oecumenical Patriarchate, without coming to agreement with Albanian authorities, undertakes the realisation of the said decision, the resistance will be much more negative. Albania is an independent state. It has its own laws and a sovereign government."

Iannulatos would like "a Hierarchy delegation of the Holy Synod to come to Albania to treat the problem also with local Orthodox functionaries."

However, the letter of Iannulatos does not at all refer to the status of autocephaly of the Albanian Orthodox Church. But, according to analysts, if for Albanians the autocephaly is indisputable and the coming of Greek metropolitans unacceptable, then, what would the Hierarchy delegation solve in Albania?

The key point of the statute of the Albanian Orthodox Autocephalous Church of 1929 says that the clergies and hierarchies should be of Albanian nationality and citizenship. This point is also included in the statuses of all the autocephalous Orthodox churches.

The Istanbul Patriarchate recognised the autocephaly of the Albanian Orthodox Church in 1936.

Albania: Rejection of 3 Orthodox Metropolitans Viewed

AU0608121196 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 3 Aug 96 p 1

[Commentary by Vladimir Prela: "Greek-Albanian Courtesy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, our authorities refused to allow the entry into the country of three senior priests appointed by the Patriarchate of Constantinople to posts as metropolitans in three southern Albanian dioceses. The official response was sent yesterday to His Grace Archbishop Janullatos, the head of the Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

This was an expected stand by the Tirana Government. Indeed, sources close to the government claim that before the official notice in writing was issued, the names of the three priests appointed by the Patriarchate were sent to border posts to be added to the list of those declared persona non grata. What is more surprising is Athens's agreement with this decision of Tirana. In an unprecedented manner, Greek officials have stated to the press that they will respect the Albanian Government's decision on the three Greek clergy. At first sight, it appears that the Greek Government does not wish to create sectarian conflict in Albania or to rekindle discussion of "the Janullatos question." It appears that Athens respects the desire of the Albanian Orthodox Church for "self-government." We have here signs of open disagreement between Archbishop Janullatos and Greeks officials on one hand, and the Patriarchate on the other hand. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that this might be a "test" of the tolerance of Tirana and the Orthodox Albanians, who not long ago organized a campaign against the domination of the Orthodox ecclesiastical hierarchy by ethnically Greek prelates.

At the same time, it appears that the Greek Government wants to continue its honeymoon with President Berisha that began just before the 26 May elections and from which Greece has benefited to the extent of two consulates in Sarande and Korce. Athens now trusts that the Albanian refusal does not in any way break the principles of Hellenism and still less the preservation and reinforcement of the rights of the Greek minority in Albania.

Speculation and commentary apart, it is worth underlining that Tirana, Athens, and Janullatos have for the first time agreed on religious problems, and this is a good sign.

Albania: Group Protests Istanbul Nomination of Greek Bishops

AU0608150696 Tirana ATA in English 1754 GMT 2 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 2 (ATA)—The Presidency of the "Fan S. Noli" National Association has sent a copy of its protest to Albanian President Sali Berisha, Parliament's Speaker Pjeter Arbnori, Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi and the dean of the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Republic of Albania, Romanian Ambassador Gheorge Miku, to make them aware of Istanbul Oecumenical Patriarchy's decision to ordain three Greek bishops in three dioceses in Albania without the approval of the Albanian Church and State.

"We consider this act an interference not only into the rights of the Albanian Autocephalous Church but also into the internal affairs of the Albanian state," the protest says.

"How is it possible that the Istanbul Patriarchy thinks to ordain in Albania only Greek Orthodox ministers and not send them to other countries of the former communist East?," the Presidency of the association asks.

The protest says that "It is not the first time the patriarchy tries to put the Albanian Orthodox Autocephalous Church in the clutches of the Hellenic Church."

The decision of the Istanbul Patriarchy runs contrary to the Statute of 1926 of the Albanian Orthodox

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Autocephalous Church. The Patriarchy recognised the autocephaly of this church in 1936.

Fan Noli, the association is named after, was chairman of the Albanian Orthodox Autocephalous Church in the U.S. He was the most outstanding activist in creating the Albanian Orthodox Church and detaching it from the denationalising influence of the Greek Church.

Albania: Minority Leader Requests Greek Classes in South

AU0608160296 Tirana ATA in English 1038 GMT 3 Aug 96

[Report by A. Sakja]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 2 (ATA)—Chairman of the Human Rights Union Party [PBDNj] Vasil Melo, demanded Friday [2 August], during a meeting with the Democratic Party [PD] Chairman Tritan Shehu, the opening of Greek classes in some districts of Southern Albania.

The PD spokesman said that Melo "voiced the concern of his party for the opening of three Greek classes in the towns of Delvine, Gjirokaster, and Sarande" as an issue "discussed in an earlier meeting between them."

This issue "has also been agreed upon to be solved in the Berisha-Stefanopoulos meeting," said Melo referring to a visit of the Greek president to Albania last March.

During the visit the Greek president, speaking of the Greek minority in Albania, considered "the opening of the Greek classes in Delvine, Gjirokaster, and Sarande in the coming school year," a fact which will "further enliven the climate of confidence and cooperation between two countries as well as the productive participation of the Greek minority in the reconstruction of Albania."

Shehu, who is also holding the post of the foreign minister, assured Melo of his support on this issue.

Both chairmen expressed their pleasure for the level of cooperation between the two parties and discussed the preparations for the new local elections.

Albania: Court Lifting of Sentences for Ex-Communist Protested

AU0708121196 Tirana ATA in English 0859 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 7 (ATA)—The National Independent Forum of Intellectuals for the denunciation of the crimes of the communist dictatorship protests against the great reduction by the Appeal Court of the sentences for five former communist chiefs whom the Tirana Court had given capital punishments or life in prison.

They are Haxhi Lleshi, former chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly; Manush Myftiu, former deputy prime minister and chairman of the Central Commission of Expulsion and Internments; Aranit Cela, former chairman of the Supreme Court and member of the commission; Rrapi Mino, former attorney general and member of the commission; Zylyftar Ramizi, former interior deputy minister, accused by the Tirana Prosecutor's Office of crimes against humanity in cooperation.

In May this year, they are charged by the Tirana Court as being the direct responsible people for the mass killings and sentences of innocent people, for the expulsion of thousands of Albanian families, many of whom lost their lives in the places where they were serving their sentences.

The report says that the forum "does not want to influence in the normal activity of the judiciaries, but it cannot consider a right judicial act the fact when various instances of our courts change to a great degree the sentences previously passed by a lower court."

The presidency of the Anticommunist Association of the Formerly Democratic Political Persecuted of Tirana had also made a protest for the same question some days ago.

The forum asks from the Appeal Court, the highest judiciary in Albania, "to act justly and to sentence without mercy the above criminals."

On July 24, the Appeal Court reduced the sentence for Zylyftar Ramizi, changing his capital punishment to life in prison. Aranit Cela and Rrapi Mino, whom the Tirana Court had passed capital punishments, had their sentences reduced to 25 years in prison. Manush Myftiu and Haxhi Lleshi, sentenced with 25 years of imprisonment, were granted five year suspended sentence by the Appeal Court.

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Bulgaria: Pirinski Interviewed on Presidential Candidacy

AU0608141096 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 6 Aug 96 p 7

[Interview with Georgi Pirinski, presidential candidate of the Democratic Left and Bulgarian foreign minister, by Kameliya Stancheva; place and date not given: "I Do Not Want To Win People's Sympathies at Any Price"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Stancheva] Mr. Pirinski, thank you for agreeing to this interview. However, I want us to talk about you personally, as your political appearances have been visible enough to the public.

[Pirinski] That is not a very promising beginning, but let us see how it turns out....

[Stancheva] You are known to be a retiring individual, one with whom it is difficult to make contact. However, the campaign has evidently changed you. How do you feel when you have to meet people all day long?

[Pirinski] This is something that is fundamental to political campaigns. In a majority election, it is inevitable for the individual in question to be more in the public view. I stated at the beginning of the campaign that I am ready to answer any question that is sufficiently well founded. However, in modern political life, we have reached extremes that I do not accept. This militates against the very effectiveness of the work. I do not seek to win support by establishing forced relations in contacts with the public. I am striving to establish a closer dialogue, not to win sympathies by any means.

[Stancheva] Yet surely your aim is to win people's sympathies, and accordingly their votes, is it not?

[Pirinski] Yes, but not necessarily by trying to make them like me. [passage omitted]

[Stancheva] Very well, but how do you feel nonetheless when you have to meet the public much more than previously?

[Pirinski] How can a person feel when he has to talk to dozens of people and answer a multitude of different questions? This is a major burden, and quite unusual as an experience day after day. The strain and mental pressure are very perceptible. However, what happens in the other direction is that the contact works in 90 percent of the cases because it is well intentioned and sincere.

[Stancheva] I assume you knew it would not be easy. Why did you agree to the presidential candidacy?

[Pirinski] The question should hardly be posed like this, that a person should accept if it is easy, and refuse if it is not.

[Stancheva] I assume that you would not have accepted if you did not really want it.

[Pirinski] What do you mean, if I did not want it...? Naturally, a man cannot be forced to do something. However, if he seriously commits himself to a position in society, he cannot easily say: "I have come this far, but now I am getting off the train." Provided, of course, that the overwhelming majority of the supporters of the left believe that this is the candidacy that has the greatest chance. I cannot turn my back on them and say: "Look, this is not very convenient for me." That does not sound right, somehow.

[Stancheva] You have served at almost all levels in the state hierarchy. Do you regard this step as the next one?

[Pirinski] As a step in my career? No, this cannot be a consideration. At least, I do not regard it as such.

[Stancheva] What do you think, then?

[Pirinski] The question is a very serious one. I think about what kind of campaign I will conduct, and what I will do when I am elected president. [passage omitted]

[Stancheva] I was asking about your personal motive. Why do you want to be president?

[Pirinski] I repeat, I do not consider the question like this, of wanting to be president.

[Stancheva] People suspect that you agreed to the candidacy as a logical continuation of your career.

[Pirinski] I cannot understand where these suspicions come from. I have never set it as a goal, nor have I ever had the ambition to run for the post of president of Bulgaria. The decision is in fulfillment of a public commitment. Since 1989, I have committed myself by my assertions, positions, and actions.

[Stancheva] Certain people who carry weight claim that your candidacy is part of a well-orchestrated scenario. It is hinted that your goal is to become prime minister, not president.

[Pirinski] What can I say? Since 1989, we have been dogged by various scenarios. One scenario or another is happening all the time.... This is a favorite topic of some commentators. I know of no such scenario, and have no part in such a one. [passage omitted]

[Stancheva] Speaking of scenarios, I will mention another theory about your candidacy. It is said that your defeat is inevitable, and that you will be discredited as a politician because the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] does not need a president.

[Pirinski] In an open society, people are free to develop all kinds of fantasies.

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[Stancheva] In fact, does the BSP really need a president?

[Pirinski] What are your grounds for asking such a question?

[Stancheva] The BSP is in full control of the executive, so why does it also need the presidential post as well?

[Pirinski] That is not a correct way of reasoning. As a serious party, the BSP wants stability and effective government.

[Stancheva] Doesn't this exist now?

[Pirinski] When the president blocks effective government as he does, and divides instead of unites, as the Constitution defines, there is evidently no chance for serious development. [passage omitted]

[Stancheva] Who in the BSP is closest to you?

[Pirinski] I do not see any sense in such a question, as it is not a matter of personal relations.

[Stancheva] Personal relations were precisely what I had in mind. Is there a person in the party on whom you rely?

[Pirinski] I have confidence in the representatives of the BSP leadership, and I hope they think the same way about me.

[Stancheva] Perhaps you are deliberately not drawing a distinction between purely human relationships and political ones.

[Pirinski] I enjoy more friendly relations with people in the OSD [Alliance for Social Democracy].

[Stancheva] Why are you avoiding taking sides now in the party disputes? Are you just being careful, or do they not interest you?

[Pirinski] I do not consider that I have avoided taking sides. It is truer to say I am not inclined to give lengthy interviews during the week, in which I comment on the processes within the BSP. I try to defend my own viewpoint at the meetings of the Supreme Council or the BSP Parliamentary Group.

[Stancheva] It seems to me that it has not become clear whether you support the OSD in its demands for a new BSP policy and a new BSP government.

[Pirinski] At a certain meeting of the Supreme Council, I declared that the structural measures can no longer be postponed. To be successful, the government must have support.

[Stancheva] Do you see eye to eye with Zhan Videnov?

[Pirinski] Well enough.

[Stancheva] Some claim the opposite.

[Pirinski] Anything can be claimed.

[Stancheva] At the start of the campaign, you declared that you would be president of the entire nation. Why then do you not take a member of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] as your vice president?

[Pirinski] Hypothetically, this question is appropriate, but it can only be asked if the united opposition declares that it sees the president as a national figure.

[Stancheva] This is part of their intentions.

[Pirinski] Yes, but without the BSP, and without forgetting "our anticommunism."

[Stancheva] Are you close to any politicians outside the BSP?

[Pirinski] I know none of them closely, but I have good relations with people like Dragomir Draganov, and perhaps a few others. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Pirinski's Suitability, Future After Elections

AU0608132196 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 6 Aug 96 p 10

[Article by Velizar Enchev: "Is Pirinski Suitable as Foreign Minister?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a normal state, participation by a foreign minister in the elections should not negatively influence the activity of state institutions. However, Bulgaria is not a normal state. As foreign minister, Pirinski was not the strategist for Bulgaria's foreign policy, which is formed personally by Zhan Videnov. The Bulgarian foreign minister is not the generator of ideas and concepts, but a regular executor of the prime minister's will, an executor who could work with equal diligence both against joining NATO and for fully joining this organization. Even when the country's independence was put under a question mark (following Yeltsin's invitation to join USSR-2), Pirinski preferred to refrain from any commentary as long as the party leader had not uttered the final word on the matter. That shameful scene at the Sofia airport will remain a symbol of our national self-humiliation. Even that scene, however, does not represent the foreign minister's business card. The only thing we can deduce from this is that in critical situations the foreign minister thinks first of all of his own head, and only afterwards about national interests. Before asking whether such a person could be our president, we must be fully convinced of his suitability as foreign minister.

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Pirinski has done more than enough to convince us that he is not suitable as foreign minister. Bulgaria is at the bottom of the united Europe's political, economic, and military structures. Even our traditional relations with Russia are stagnating. Our policy toward the neighboring states has gradually been subjugated to bloc thinking, and we are thus about to lose such strategic partners as Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia. After promising to conduct our foreign policy on the basis of economic factors, Pirinski could boast of the following achievements: Foreign investment in Bulgaria is at a critically low state, while foreign markets remain a mirage for Bulgaria. Our country received no compensation for observing the Yugo-embargo. We were isolated from the restoration processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina (because of Sofia's inconsistent policy toward Sarajevo). The project regarding the new bridge over the Danube is in a state of a clinical death, regardless of Joannina-1 and Joannina-2.

Whatever the foreign policy issue that Pirinski touches, the result is almost always pitiful. This does not prevent the state propaganda from declaring the failed Bulgarian diplomacy as Pirinski's triumph. For but one of those failures in our foreign policy Pirinski should have resigned. Indeed, those failures reveal not only the impotence of Pirinski the diplomat, but also the unquestionable economic incompetence of the former deputy minister of foreign trade.

As Pirinski is leaving such a legacy in the Foreign Ministry, it could have been expected that the deputy foreign ministers would have demonstrated greater initiative.

It has already been announced that First Deputy Foreign Minister Stefan Staykov will assume Pirinski's representative functions as long as Pirinski is trying to convince the nation that he is the most suitable candidate for president. However, Staykov is not a political figure, and has no apparatus positions in Positano Street [Bulgarian Socialist Party headquarters] to allow himself any diplomatic activity. He knows very well who actually runs the Foreign Ministry, and thus harbors no illusions that his great moment has come. In addition, he realizes that a more efficient foreign policy over the next three months would inflict a lethal blow to the authority of his boss, because at the height of the presidential campaign it would become apparent that our diplomacy registered greater successes without Pirinski. In other words, it would become evident that Pirinski was the political barrier blocking the activity of the professional diplomats. We can state with absolute certainty that Staykov will not make such a mistake, which could be fatal to his career.

Deputy Foreign Minister Irina Bokova has even less motivation to give Bulgarian diplomacy a new image, or at least strengthen the diplomatic reflexes, as her brother, Filip Bokov, is the head of Pirinski's election staff. In this case, family relations are blocking the initiative of the deputy foreign minister in charge of European integration. Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Khristov, in charge of Balkan policy, finds himself in a similar position. He lacks Staykov's diplomatic experience and the comfortable family positions of the Bokovs. Therefore, he absolutely lacks any motivation to develop unnecessary activity in such a risky zone as Balkan policy. In this area, Videnov eliminates everyone who dares to correct his ideological bias.

Thus if Pirinski's candidacy is rejected by the Central Elections Commission or the Supreme Court (which is very likely), or if he loses the presidential elections (as the most recent polls are indicating), Zhan Videnov will have to take a serious look around for another foreign minister. Whoever he is, wherever he has been born, and whatever political ideas he professes, he must first of all be a professional.

As far as Pirinski's political future is concerned, the situation will not be very tragic if he leaves the cabinet. His place on the left side of the National Assembly is reserved, and in the diplomatic missions abroad there will always be a place for an obedient ambassador with a good command of the English language. In any case, it would be better for the nation if Pirinski were an ambassador abroad rather than president.

Bulgaria: Videnov Responds to OSD Attacks on Cabinet

AU0608120996 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 6 Aug 96 p 5

["Letter to the Editor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [DUMA editor in chief] Comrade Prodev:

A few days ago, you used the pages of DUMA to reject the recent attacks made by Mr. Andrey Bundzhulov [member of Alliance for Social Democracy, OSD] against the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]. You severely criticized similar attempts to block the party's work prior to the elections. At the same time, the DUMA editorial board has recently discussed unconfirmed information that the Executive Bureau of the BSP Supreme Council reportedly wants to expel Mr. Andrey Raychev [OSD member and a founder of SEGA weekly] and Mr. Andrey Bundzhulov from the party. These are serious issues that should be presented to the public as clearly as possible. For this reason, I welcome

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your decision to publish the explanations given by Mr. Bundzhulov. However, for a newspaper like DUMA, this cannot be the end of the subject. The circle of friends centered at SEGA also owes us an explanation about the innumerable insinuations, libels, and insults that it has been hurling at the BSP for almost a year. A policy to keep your readers from the unpleasant truth about the gentlemen mentioned above, who for some tactical reasons of their own represent themselves as Socialists, is not a good policy. I would like to believe that DUMA will follow a quite different line.

One should no longer keep silent about the open secret that the group in question has fabricated the larger part of the "affairs" and "scandals," about which it has recently been demanding that the BSP provide justifications, and with which it has provided abundant food for the opposition press. DUMA is fully entitled to ask these people: Who are they and what lies at the bottom of their maniacal political ambition and fury? What wealth do they hold inside the country and abroad? How did they create this wealth? Why did they expect the government of the Democratic Left to serve them when they became disillusioned with it, and how are they now working to overthrow the government?

The gentlemen in question hardly make secret their claim that the state should provide them with some kind of monopoly on information, publicity, and public opinion polls. This evidently matches their wolfish appetite for business. They probably believe that by acting in this way they can pass off their own "information policy" on the people, instead of the news about an honest and responsible government of the Left and instead of the news about a truly strong state.

The people who fear a strong state and a responsible government are mainly members of the mafia. It is well known that for them interests, not parties, are important. Accordingly, you should not be concerned about "punishments and expulsions" because these people will leave us of their own accord, since they are cowardly, apart from anything else. They have never been responsible for anything, whereas our own lot—the lot of the Bulgarian Socialists—is quite different.

With comradely greetings,

Zhan Videnov

Sofia, 4 August 1996

Bulgaria: OSD Member Raychev Answers Videnov Letter

AU0708110896 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 7 Aug 96 p 7

[Interview with Andrey Raychev, member of the Alliance for Social Democracy, OSD, and founder of the weekly SEGA, by Nina Atanasova; place and date not given: "The Prime Minister Is Expecting His Own End"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Atanasova] Mr. Raychev, why did BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] leader Videnov send a letter to you via DUMA?

[Raychev] Because the Alliance for Social Democracy [OSD] has been criticizing the policies he is following.

[Atanasova] He expects you to leave the party of your own volition as a result of his letter. Will you do this?

[Raychev] It is much more likely that Videnov will withdraw from the party. Through his letter, he aims to discredit us and attach labels to us.

[Atanasova] What will be written on your label?

[Raychev] That I am one of those people who out of personal interest represent themselves as Socialists, but who otherwise work for private interests. This is not the truth, however.

Videnov does not answer a single one of my criticisms. He does not say a word concerning the lack of bread, the collapse of the banking system, or about the gross errors made in connection with foreign investments.

[Atanasova] Videnov expects an explanation from the group of friends centered on SEGA concerning "the innumerable insinuations, libels, and insults that you have been hurling at the BSP."

[Raychev] You see, he applies to us his own expression "group of friends"—the expression he used to describe "Orion" when he was accused of links to that group.

SEGA was the first to publish Trenev's tape and write about the scandal surrounding the government's "Orion" group. It is absurd for Videnov now to be angry at the mirror that reflects some things that he finds unpleasant.

[Atanasova] Why did you infuriate the prime minister so much?

[Raychev] We called for a debate to start within the party, but instead of this we are receiving insults. The prime minister accuses us of criminal activity! Videnov is exasperated, and so writes this letter. He expects his own shameful political end, and is acting irrationally. The letter and its tone are in a neo-Stalinist style. Videnov takes my statement that the state

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should withdraw from the economy, transforms it to suit himself, and concludes that my aim is for the state to weaken and that I belong to the mafia.

I do not want a weak state, but a lessening of its presence in the economy, to allow the state to concentrate on justice, law and order in the streets, and so forth. However, for a man who appointed Lyubomir Nachev as interior minister to accuse me of criminal activity is more than cynical.

[Atanasova] What is to happen in this party, now that its leaders are starting to communicate with one another in such a way?

[Raychev] Inevitably, it has to draw up its balance sheet. By the end of the year, the BSP has to decide whether it is a social democratic party of the European type or some indefinite structure.

[Atanasova] When did the two of you stop discussing the party's problems together?

[Raychev] This is a matter concerning political trends within the party, not merely one that concerns the two individuals Videnov and Raychev. For the majority of Socialists, the BSP is not the party that they want it to be. I do not agree that a dialogue within the party will obstruct its preparations for the presidential elections.

Bulgaria: BSP's Marinov Views Cabinet, Party Failures

AU0708125196 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 7 Aug 96 p 9

[Interview with Aleksandur Marinov, member of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction and former chairman of the BSP Sofia City Organization, by Valeriya Veleva; place and date not given: "Zhan Videnov Signed Bulgaria's Capitulation With the IMF"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Veleva] Mr. Marinov, you are talking about the necessity of forming a new Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] policy. One month ago, the Alliance for Social Democracy [OSD] started doing the same this. Is there a connection?

[Marinov] It might sound archaic, but there simply is no connection. People who usually have different opinions spoke about the necessity of adopting a new BSP policy at the 10 March meeting of the socialist deputies, and then again at the end of May. The understanding that a new policy is necessary, especially in the economic field, develops more and more within the party and among its supporters. What is being advertised now, and not very precisely implemented as policy, is a mixture of utopia, wishful thinking, and results, against a background of meager means and possibilities which have not been utilized to facilitate implementation.

[Veleva] Could this team of leaders implement a new policy?

[Marinov] No. They cannot. Neither this team nor this prime minister could implement a new policy. This does not mean that in this cabinet there are no people who would be suitable participants in the next cabinet, but they are a minority.

[Veleva] Is Andrey Raychev right in demanding the replacement of party and state leadership prior to the presidential elections?

[Marinov] This is the most delicate aspect of the issue. The present party and state leadership have two strong trump cards. The first is that we are implementing structural reform, and this is why we are being attacked. The second—why before the presidential elections? I am not convinced that the OSD position, and especially Andrey Raychev's view were expressed in the best manner and at the best time, but in essence, the content is correct. I am deeply convinced that if serious qualitative changes do not take place in our behavior and policy as a ruling party, rather than mimic such changes, our chances to win the presidential elections are greatly reduced. [passage omitted]

[Veleva] Is this inertia that engulfed the deputies and the BSP Supreme Council not horrible? Have you not been alone in your protest until this very moment?

[Marinov] I am not alone. By this, I do not claim that there is an organization behind me. Similar opinion have already been expressed by other people: Yuriy Borisov's position on the budget, and the statements by Nikolay Kamov, the OSD members, and our "patriarchs"—Lilov and Lukanov. And I am not referring to opinions many colleagues are expressing within a more narrow circle of people. Unfortunately however, in the BSP there are many old reflexes. At present, each of the party's political figures is experiencing an internal drama—should he dare say what he is thinking, even in conversations with those to whom he is closest? Everyone is assessing the possible consequences if he does. I do not accuse my colleagues of failing to do what I am doing. Everyone has the right of choice. [passage omitted]

[Veleva] Would a loss in the presidential elections lead to what the OSD is saying—a new government and early parliamentary elections?

[Marinov] It is possible. The opposition will have strong arguments if it wins the presidential elections. First of

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all, it will have a representative in one of the state institutions, even if it has limited prerogatives. Second, it will have the opportunity to claim that the public assessment and mood have changed since December 1994. In addition, the opposition will be in a public and emotional upsurge. However, all this does not necessarily lead to early parliamentary elections. The problem is that a possible defeat in the presidential elections will be incorporated in a more comprehensive socioeconomic situation in the country, which for its part, could prompt early parliamentary elections. [passage omitted]

[Veleva] The opinion is asserting itself in Bulgaria that the left failed in its rule.

[Marinov] This is true. However, regardless of how small the possibility, there still is the chance to change this impression. I am convinced that the left could rule better. However, I also cannot accept the report from the Democratic Left parliamentary faction and many statements from the prime minister in which the truth has been distorted. It has been said that we started structural reform, and that this reform prompted financial destabilization, unemployment, and bankruptcies, and that against this background the opposition intensified its activity, centrifugal forces developed in the party, and so on. This simply is not true. The structural reform has not yet begun. There are certain decisions which affect partial aspects of this reform, such as the elimination of enterprises, financial isolation, and so on. Whatever has happened so far in Bulgaria is not the result of the structural reform but of crude mistakes by the leadership, by failing to utilize the chances we had after 1995, the heritage of the previous government, and by failing to properly assess the hazards. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: SDS Official Suggests MVR Link to Bomb

AU0708090396 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 7 Aug 96 p 4

[Interview with Yordan Sokolov, leader of the Parliamentary Group of the Union of Democratic Forces, by Sevda Dinovska; place and date not given: "The Bomb Explosion in the National Palace of Culture May Justify Declaring a State of Emergency"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dinovska] Mr. Sokolov, what gives you grounds to suspect that the Interior Ministry [MVR] may have a hand in the bomb explosion in the National Palace of Culture?

[Sokolov] Suspicions may be voiced, because, in this incident, the explosion was of a force that has not been used in any other terrorist act. The headless nails added to the charge, which were intended to injure people, did not hit anyone. In addition, how did it come about that a pedestrian subway that is busy even after midnight turned out to be empty at the very time of the explosion?

[Dinovska] These are serious charges against the Interior Ministry and the special services, Mr. Sokolov.

[Sokolov] They are merely suppositions that should be elucidated. I hope the inquiry will provide an answer, because such an incident can easily be used (if there are interested parties, and such groups evidently exist in Bulgaria) as a reason to say: "Look, we have now reached the stage of purely political bomb attempts" and to justify the declaration of a state of emergency in our country.

[Dinovska] However, at your meeting with Nikolay Dobrev in the National Assembly, you, as leader of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] Parliamentary Group, supported the measures that the interior minister proposed to combat terrorism.

[Sokolov] We supported the measures that Minister Dobrev described because they were in no way "extraordinary measures," but simply corresponded to the situation. There has been a sharp increase in terrorist acts, and the Interior Ministry was bound to react properly, by proposing increased police protection in certain locations, specially trained dogs, and so on. However, it is alarming that certain people want to present the minister's measures as "extraordinary."

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Czech Republic: DEU, KAN To Join ODA in Senate Elections

AU0608124696 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 6 Aug 96 p 2

[Article by "pan": "DEU and KAN Welcome ODA Offer To Cooperate in the Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The small right-wing parties—the Democratic Union [DEU] and the Club of Nonaligned Activists [KAN]—welcome the offer from Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] Chairman Jan Kalvoda to cooperate in the Senate elections. The Union plans to list between 15 and 20 persons on the joint slate of ODA and the People's Party, and the Club of Nonaligned Activists about seven.

"We consider the offer reasonable and will be as accommodating as we can be," DEU Chairman Ratibor Majzlik said. KAN head Pavel Holba also praised Kalvoda's proposal. "The offer corresponds to the spirit of nonpartisan politics," he said.

Majzlik mentioned two specific names his party will propose—himself for the ninth ward in Prague and the DEU deputy chairman, actor Ivan Vuskocil, for Prague 8. The candidacy of the DEU honorary chairman, Alena Hromadkova, is also likely.

KAN has published four Senate hopefuls so far—Chairman Pavel Holba; Deputy Chairman Jiri Machac; Helena Frankenbergerova, a member of the Presidium; and the chairman of KAN in Opava, Jiri Volny.

Kalvoda confirmed that ODA has already talked with Club representatives. So far, however, neither have specific names of candidates been mentioned nor the form of joint approach. Kalvoda plans to talk with DEU Chairman Majzlik early next week.

Kalvoda said on Friday that the joint entry of ODA and the People's Party into the Senate elections is an endeavor to seek alternatives to the party slates. However, the People's Party considers including members of other parties than theirs and ODA only an extreme possibility.

Czech Republic: Army Corruption 'Scandal' Under Investigation

AU0608133796 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 6 Aug 96 p 3

[Article by "km": "Another Suspicion of Corruption in the Army Is Investigated"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Army is the focus of another corruption scandal as police begin to suspect one of its employees of taking bribes in the sale of real estate.

The Office for Investigation in Prague's 10th District launched the criminal action last week against the director of the Military Spa and Resort Facilities, Jan Paulu, for the suspicion of demanding approximately 800,000 korunas for mediating the sale of one military real estate unit.

Tomas Repka, press spokesman for the defense minister, confirmed yesterday that Minister Miloslav Vyborny suspended the director of the Military Spa and Resort Facilities and entrusted Nadezda Ruzickova with the job.

The suspicious activity of the Army agency was reported by the EAT travel bureau, which leases the military resort in Bedrichov near Spindleruv Mlyn. The owner of the EAT bureau reported to the police that Paulu asked for a commission for arranging the purchase of a piece of real estate.

The police corruption detection department set a trap in a Prague restaurant and caught Jan Paulu as he accepted the bribe.

Jan Paulu, who is under investigation but has not been arrested, could not be reached for comment. According to the BLESK daily, however, he claimed as recently as last Friday that he does not know anything about it.

It is the third instance of Army corruption investigated by the police. Several more attempts at bribes in the Army are under investigation by intelligence or inspection departments of the Defense Ministry.

Czech Republic: Kyrgyzstan Reportedly Cannot Pay for Radar

AU0508150196 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 3 Aug 96 p 2

[Article by "km": "Because of Lack of Funds, Kyrgyzstan Has Not Yet Picked Up Tamara"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The unique Tamara espionage radar system, which is to be exported to the Central Asian country of Kyrgyzstan, has not left the Republic, and the experts would not rule out that this government-approved sale will never be realized.

"Kyrgyzstan is not able to raise the $20 million needed for the purchase of Tamara. It has been all quiet for more than a year," a source close to government circles stated last week.

Ludek Stodulka, deputy president of the firm HTP Group, Tesla Pardubice, which manufactures Tamara, confirmed that Kyrgyzstan has difficulties financing the purchase but denied that the deal is off. "There is nothing lost," Stodulka claims.

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Jan Maisler from the Foreign Ministry said that his sector has nothing to do with the contract. "Only a problem between the two business partners has kept Tamara from leaving the Republic. We approved the export," Maisler said. Similarly, the Industry and Trade Ministry stated that it cannot help the contract anymore.

The difficulties accompanying the export of Tamara became a topic of discussion about six months ago, when the Kyrghyz foreign minister visited the Czech Republic. At the time, however, all of the parties to the contract claimed that the problem of financing would be resolved within several weeks.

The sale of Tamara, which has been exported since 1989 only to Oman, would bring the manufacturer out of the crisis. The HTT Group owes its 70 creditors a total of 1.5 billion korunas. The Pardubice company managed to prevent bankruptcy proceedings precisely because of the deal with Kyrgyzstan.

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Slovakia: Foreign Ministry on U.S. Bill on NATO Enlargement

AU0608141596 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 6 Aug 96 p 2

[Unattributed report: "MZV SR Statement on the 1996 Bill on Facilitating NATO Enlargement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From the point of view of the Slovak Republic's strategic foreign policy orientation, the Slovak Foreign Ministry [MZV SR] views the 1996 draft bill facilitating NATO enlargement and its approval by both houses of the U.S. Congress to be one of the important measures leading toward the membership of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in NATO.

The MZV SR is, in view of the Slovak Republic's integrative interests, disappointed by its noninclusion among the countries that have made significant progress in their preparations for membership in NATO. Despite this disappointment, which stems from a lack of understanding for the Slovak Republic's integrative and transformation endeavors, the MZV SR considers the incorporation of new members to be a dynamic process, and accepts this fact as a challenge to further intensify cooperation with the U.S. Administration, and mainly with Congress. On the other hand, the MZV SR appreciates the fact that the draft law underlines the U.S. desire to support "the full-fledged and active participation of the Slovak Republic" and other countries "in the activities necessary for fulfilling the criteria for admission into NATO, countries that may be included among the recipients of assistance on the basis of a decision by the U.S. President." The MZV SR considers positive the draft bill's emphasis that the process of NATO enlargement not be confined by only considering admission for those countries that have made "significant progress in their readiness for membership in NATO."

The MZV SR believes that the upcoming visits by senior Slovak officials to the United States, which will be used to intensify dialogue and convey a positive message to the U.S. Administration and Congress with regard to the measures oriented toward further increasing the Slovak Republic's readiness for membership in NATO, will be answered by the inclusion by the United States of the Slovak Republic in the group of countries best prepared for membership in the Alliance.

Slovakia: Government Daily Comments on U.S. Language Bill

AU0608125596 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 6 Aug 96 p 1

[Commentary by Monika Volekova in the "Public Matter" editorial column]

[FBIS Translated Text] The U.S. Congress House of Representatives passed a bill last week making English the official language in the United States. Admittedly, this norm is still subject to approval by the Senate and has to be signed by President Bill Clinton, but the Republicans and Democrats have, in the run up to the presidential elections, already sent an important signal about their policy to the countries of central Europe and also to their voters from the various ethnic minorities. English is, according to the bill, something that unites the country and, first and foremost, should be mastered by immigrants. The Republicans support such a philosophy, while the governing Democrats have described the bill conceived in this manner as fractionalist, anti-immigrant, and disrespectful of the minorities. To put it simply, the stance of the Democrats is close to that of our Hungarian politicians and, in turn, the view of the Republicans is akin to the complete integration of the citizens of the Slovak Republic. Even the finding that U.S. Slovaks voted mostly for the Republicans is not new. Nothing, however, is black and white. Despite the presidential elections or the various conferences throughout the world, common sense and the endeavor to give an equal chance to everyone to find their place in society—no matter what their ethnicity—should prevail. The United States has become the promised land, first and foremost, because it made this possible. Maybe, the ethnic minorities "disappear" in the United States, given its size and number of inhabitants, but the very opposite is the case in central Europe. No matter whether a democrat or a republican wins the presidency, the United States will have to define constantly its view on the rights of the ethnic minorities (including linguistic minorities) in the central European region, because the point of view of a power always carries weight. The statement on the lack of support for autonomy on an ethnic basis and the bashful silence about the talks with the Hungarian Government on the Budapest meeting contain a grain of incongruity and do not help to clarify matters. The United States and the Slovak Republic are more alike than we think.

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Slovakia: Commentary Views Need for Lobby in Washington

AU0608171896 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 6 Aug 96 pp 1, 13

[Commentary by Otakar Korinek: "Why Slovakia Needs a Lobby"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovakia needs a lobby. A lobby is not omnipotent, but it is powerful. But even if Slovakia had had one yesterday, it would have been too late. Slovenia has managed to join Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the bill to facilitate the expansion of NATO thanks to its lobby. If such countries as Israel, Taiwan, and other industrially advanced countries have lobbies in Washington, if all the giant Japanese, U.S., and other foreign companies have lobbies, they certainly know why. Lobbying is a specific feature of Washington, which does not exist in such an organized and powerful form anywhere else in the world. It has operated there for over 200 years. Its existence is not even a public secret in Washington. It is a normal fact of political life.

After the emergence of Slovakia, Gabcikovo [hydroelectric project]—of course, the Hungarian version of it—was a burning issue in the U.S. press and in political circles, how the evil Slovaks were destroying the environment. It was never heard that Hungary was violating an international treaty. There was never a line printed about the environmental concerns being disproved. The recent conference Hungary and Hungarians Living Abroad was not mentioned in the U.S. press, despite its destabilizing effect. The "oppression" of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia is, however, always on the agenda. No article has appeared on the rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. The language law was attacked from all sides. The contents of the law, however, or its objectives could not be found in the U.S. media. Nevertheless, this influences the politicians, and they vote in Congress accordingly.

Another topic is Slovakia's favorable economic results. Two or three sentences have been uttered about them within the framework of negative political articles, but there is an absence of any enlightened reports. There was one, a lobby firm mediating its publication for free just to demonstrate its power. [sentence as published]

The restitution of Jewish property is a sensitive issue in the United States. THE WASHINGTON TIMES recently described Hungary as the model of such restitution and the Polish president emphasized during a recent visit to the United States that Poland had implemented restitution. No one has ever mentioned that Slovakia dealt with the legal restitution of Jewish property in 1993 and was the first of the postcommunist countries to do so.

What does this have to do with lobbying? A lobbyist firm can guarantee that selected issues are presented in the media by leading reporters. There are also other forms. Nothing is for free, but it does not have to cost much. And it is not just the media, as lobbying also has an effect on political circles, as can be illustrated by the case of Slovenia.

So far, the Slovak Republic has defended itself mostly in the form of letters from the Embassy to newspapers. They are published in the Letters to the Editor section. On the one hand, they go unnoticed; on the other hand, they cannot have any real impact, because an embassy always defends its country. It is not a matter of painting the facts in rosy colors, but rather a matter of an active, balanced presentation of the pluses and minuses of the country.

"Washington has been here for 200 years. Certain methods of work have developed here. Whoever does not respect them cannot succeed," George Reedy, press secretary of President Lyndon Johnson, wrote in his book. He is right.

Slovakia: Meciar Invited for 'Official Visit' to Bonn

AU0708075896 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Aug 96 p 1

[CTK report: "V. Meciar Has Received an Invitation to Bonn"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bonn—Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar has been invited to Germany for an official visit, but, so far, no date has been fixed. This information was given to the CTK correspondent in Bonn yesterday by an official from the German Government's press office. The spokesman was unable to say when the invitation had been decided upon or if the visit would take place this year. Slovak Foreign Ministry State Secretary Jozef Sestak spoke on Thursday [1 August] about an anticipated meeting between Prime Minister V. Meciar and German Chancellor H. Kohl this year. It was impossible to obtain confirmation yesterday of another announced visit, that of Minister Klaus Kinkel to Slovakia "at the start of the fall."

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Slovakia: Daily Warns Against Reassessing Hungarian Treaty

AU0708114096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 6 Aug 96 p 4

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "Treaty Like a Boomerang"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The repeated indications on the part of the coalition Slovak National Party [SNS] that the Basic Slovak-Hungarian Treaty—which has just been ratified by the deputies of this party—needs to be reassessed, demonstrate that Slota's people are looking for an area in which they can retaliate for the affront they suffered in the recent coalition crisis. Considering that the privatization court has been dangerously reduced in size, there is nothing left but to seek some substitute. The question now arises as to whether they do so on their own, or whether someone uses them as a hammer on the anvil of Slovak-Hungarian relations. The first possibility could mean that the SNS realized, albeit late, that it fell into the trap set by Meciar, when the prime minister promised a return for certain services but afterward seemed as if he forgot to honor the agreements. No politician likes that—coalition or opposition. That simply is not done because politics is a form of trade, in which even oral agreements are honored by all parties. It is called a gentlemen's agreement in political jargon, and it has greater weight among decent people than a written document.

If the SNS acts, however, on behalf and in the employ of the stronger coalition partner with the aim of checking out the possible reactions of the treaty partner and those abroad, it provides a chance for its boss to present himself as the defender of the treaty, and in extension also of peace and stability in the region, jeopardized by the radicals on both banks of the Danube River.

At any rate, playing with abrogation of treaties, while the ratification ink hardly had time to dry, is nothing but a gamble. Hungary has done nothing so far that would encourage Bratislava even to contemplate such a radical step aloud. The intentionally unspecified use of the term "autonomy" in the recent resolution of the Hungarian-Hungarian conference in Budapest calls for quiet diplomacy. After all, discretion is the better part of valor. Moreover, it is necessary to realize that it is not only silently that Prime Minister Horn speaks on behalf of the present Hungarian Government in favor of Slovakia not being entirely dropped from the integration package. The Hungarian Government is aware of the risks arising from this possibility not only for bilateral relations but for the entire region.

The Slovak political scene, if it does not want to lose even that little bit of foreign political credibility it acquired by signing the basic treaty, should learn not to play with it. It is creating the possibility that it will return (if it has not already) like a boomerang that will indiscriminately hit all the citizens of this state. After all, gamblers belong in gambling dens, not in politics.

Slovakia: Meciar's Privatization 'Guarantee' to SDL Noted

AU0608160796 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 6 Aug 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Vladimir Jancura: "The Value of Meciar's Guarantee"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The PRAVDA editorial office has obtained the written statement that Vladimir Meciar gave to the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] leadership on 21 June. The document contains a guarantee from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] chairman and prime minister that the National Property Fund [FNM] will not issue privatization decisions until the planned restructuring of the FNM's bodies takes place.

"In the interest of calming the political situation and creating the conditions for carrying out the restructuring of the National Property Fund's bodies with the participation of the opposition political parties," says the statement, "I give a political guarantee that, as of 21 June 1996, no privatization decisions will be made within the FNM's bodies. This political guarantee will be valid until the date for the approval of the restructuring of the FNM's bodies in the National Council of the Slovak Republic." This is followed by the signature of V. Meciar, HZDS chairman and Slovak prime minister.

The SDL Presidium decided at its session yesterday to make the document public. This is in response to Thursday's [1 August] decision by the FNM Presidium to privatize a further 41 enterprises by direct sales to owners specified in advance. "The SDL considers this step to be a manifestation of the political untrustworthiness of V. Meciar," says the SDL's top leadership in a statement released yesterday.

Jozef Migas threatened a week ago, when the first reports that the FNM intended to continue privatization by direct sales were made public, to publish the written guarantee that Vladimir Meciar gave to the SDL during the coalition crisis.

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Slovakia: FNM Decisions Diminish Meciar's 'Credibility'

AU0608152196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Aug 96 p 2

[Article by Zita Sujova: "Brigita Schmognerova: Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's Credibility Has Been Diminished Substantially by His Failure To Keep the Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—According to Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] Deputy Chairwoman Brigita Schmognerova, there are also very important and significant enterprises among the 41 companies for which the National Property Fund [FNM] Presidium issued privatization decisions on Thursday [1 August]. HOSPODARSKE NOVINY published a list of them yesterday. She mentioned specifically Nafta Gbely, Juhoslovenske Celulozky a Papierne [South Slovak Pulp and Paper Mills] Sturovo, Povazske Chemicke Zavody [Vah Chemical Plants] Zilina, Hydrostav Bratislava, and several construction companies. As she said in an interview for NARODNA OBRODA, "it has again turned out that certain particular, individual, or group privatization interests have proven to be more paramount than national and state interests." Thus, according to her, "the credibility of the prime minister," who gave the SDL a written guarantee that there would be no privatization until the FNM's bodies are restructured, "has diminished substantially." B. Schmognerova did not rule out the possibility that there is a dispute between Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and the other cabinet members and that "presumably, the decision on Slovenska Pojistovna [Slovak Insurance Company] was also made behind the prime minister's back." In reply to a question on whether she concedes that the FNM Presidium issued its decisions without the knowledge of V. Meciar, she said literally: "If he had disagreed with this, he could have told us that this was not a violation of his undertaking, but that it was going on behind his back. As he did not do this, it can be assumed that he was informed of it." (The SDL will publish the text of the undertaking at a press briefing today.)

B. Schmognerova also pointed out that FNM Presidium President Stefan Gavornik based his justification for the privatization decisions on "the increasing demands from Ministers Peter Baco, Jan Ducky, and Jan Mraz." According to B. Schmognerova, however, the most recent amendment to the law does not enable the ministries to intervene in privatization decisions. "I think that this raises the very justified question of whether these privatization interests are really becoming more paramount than anything else, and whether they are also beginning to dictate to the prime minister," she said. Despite the discrepancy between the intentions endorsed by the prime minister and some government members, B. Schmognerova would not describe the situation as a government crisis; rather, this is "major solidarity among parties of a specific kind, parties bound together by privatization interests."

In reply to a question on whether the FNM Presidium's decisions are at variance with the law, and can thus be canceled, she said that these decisions by the FNM Presidium are not formally contestable. It is, according to her, impossible to make a blanket statement concerning whether they are at variance with the law. "This does not only concern these 41 enterprises, but this ruling coalition's entire privatization policy. It is evident that laws have been violated in dozens of cases there. It is merely a question of acquiring sufficient evidence," she added.

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Hungary: Official Views Prospects for EU Integration

AU0608151796 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 3 Aug 96 p 8

[Interview with Andras Inotai, head of the Integration Strategy Work Group, by Dezso Pinter; place and date not given: "Hungary Is Facing the Role of Mediator"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Pinter] Is Hungary interested in the quickest possible EU membership or in the best prepared EU acceptance possible?

[Inotai] According to an unofficial plan, Hungary can become an EU member by the year 2001 or 2002 and the political conditions can be created and the country can be prepared by then. According to current estimates, joining the EU later than these dates would involve considerable extra expenses and not only economic ones. Developments leading to the creation of new circumstances are expected to take place in Europe over the next 10 years. It would be advantageous for us to face these new circumstances as EU members. Nobody knows, for example, what will happen in Russia and in some other countries currently under reorganization. It is true that the process of restructuring has become irreversible everywhere, but we cannot evaluate the changes and the consequences. We must accelerate Hungary's adjustment process. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Although there is a political answer on the part of the EU, there is not yet a decision, so we can only speculate for the coming period. What are these speculations?

[Inotai] In the EU's case, we are assuming that the political decision on eastward expansion will be followed by the start of official negotiations after the intergovernmental conference scheduled to end in the summer of 1997 or at the beginning of 1998 at the latest. It is also being assumed that these negotiations will end around the year 2000 and this process will not be hindered by any global or European events, or political, economic, and social events within the EU. As for the assumptions regarding Hungary, the first one is that we will succeed in creating conditions of economic stability and lasting economic growth; in other words, Hungary will embark on a path of dynamic development within a short time. We are also assuming that the social and political expenses of creating stability and preparing the country for EU membership will remain under control. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Is there any division in the EU in connection with Hungary's membership, one based on political trends?

[Inotai] It is not true that the leftist and social-democratic parties in the EU member countries are clearly in favor of the EU's eastern expansion, while the conservatives are against this. In some cases, the opposite is true. Social democratic parties are often helpless in their own countries when they face double-digit unemployment. Free movement of labor is part of this EU membership and these parties are apprehensive about the free labor in central and eastern Europe, namely that this sometimes well trained and efficient labor will take western European jobs for a fraction of the western European labor costs. The 1990s demand totally different solutions. The director of Audi was seriously criticized for offering 600 jobs to Hungary while unemployment in Germany was over 10 percent. The director said that, without the 600 Hungarian jobs, he would have had to close down his entire factory in Germany that employs 3,000 people, because he would not be competitive. He had to create 600 jobs abroad in order to keep 3,000 jobs in Germany. If Europe fails to deal with unemployment in overall European levels, some EU countries will not be able to avoid the gradual dismantling of the social welfare state. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] To what extent will the neighboring countries' accusations against Hungary on the matter of autonomy stick in the EU's ears?

[Inotai] I would not like to believe that these accusations will stick at all, but this is not certain. As a result of our relations with our neighbors, some leading circles of EU countries presented Hungary as a risk factor between 1990 and 1994. We succeeded in getting rid of this stigma after 1994, primarily because of the signing of the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty and of negotiating on a Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty. Because of the national tragedies that caused the dismemberment of its history and traditions, Hungary is in a special situation. It would be fatal if anyone tried to hinder Hungary's acceptance by the EU by provoking tensions; similarly, it would fatal if a political intention emerged in Hungary that would hinder the Euro-Atlantic integration of our neighbors. We must put aside our short-term interests, because the problems with one another can be solved within the EU framework. If we stay outside the EU, these problems will become even more serious and, in addition, nobody will be interested any more in what we are doing with one another. Only countries that are capable of settling their relations can become EU members.

[Pinter] Is there any power in this region that could blackmail Hungary with this?

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[Inotai] I cannot imagine any responsible politician anywhere who would consider such a thing. It is hardly certain that Hungary could be kept out of the EU by blackmail. The blackmailing country, however, would disappear from the EU focus for a long time. This does not mean that there are not groups in neighboring countries or in more distant countries that might try to come up with irrational arguments and deeds. Hungary is facing the role of a mediator. It must constantly speak in favor of countries that might not make it into the EU together with us. [passage omitted]

Hungary: FRY Rejects Hungarian-Hungarian Summit Decision

AU0608151596 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 6 Aug 96 pp 1, 3

[Correspondent's report: "Belgrade Also Vetoes the Hungarian-Hungarian Summit Statement"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Yugoslav government and public are worried by the content of the resolution adopted by the Hungarian-Hungarian conference organized by the Office of Hungarian Beyond the Borders in June this year with the participation of representatives of ethnic Hungarian minorities living in neighboring countries—a memorandum submitted to MTI by the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry reads. The joint statement represents a step in Hungary's efforts to expand the authority of its government to citizens of neighboring countries.

Belgrade also opposes that the Hungarian leadership should "take responsibility" for the fate of Hungarians living beyond Hungary's borders. This contradicts the principle according to which the government of a given country is responsible for its citizens, the memorandum says.

The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry regards as unacceptable the fact that the Hungarian Government supports the ethnic Hungarian minorities' demand for ethnic and minority autonomy, and stressed that in addition to leading to the "ghettoization" of a given minority, autonomy would also lead to a division according to national affiliation, and this would be a constant source of confrontations and separatist manifestations. "The principles mentioned in the joint statement do not contribute to the building of good-neighborly relations and to increasing stability in the region," the memorandum says. [passage omitted]

Hungary: SZDSZ on 'Unjustified' Slovak, Romanian Criticism

AU0608145796 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 3 Aug 96 p 5

[Article by "weinwurm": "SZDSZ: Our Neighbors' Outbursts Are Unjustified; Honest Intentions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The situation that has evolved after the Hungarian-Hungarian summit is not the fault of the government or Hungarian diplomacy, because in both Slovakia and Romania political forces exist that are interested in pointing at Hungary as the root cause of the region's instability, Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] politician Matyas Eorsi, chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, told MAGYAR NEMZET. According to Eorsi, the fact that the official Slovak leadership is attacking the autonomy efforts of Hungarians beyond the border so vehemently means nothing. "If the statement had said something else, then they would have found fault with something else," Eorsi said.

In his view, the cause of the vehement attacks has to be sought mainly in Slovak and Romanian domestic politics. This is the way their politicians try to divert attention from the domestic political difficulties, like the recent Slovak government coalition crisis.

The signing of the statement does not mean anything new in the SZDSZ's politics, because it is almost fully contained, although in different wording, in the government program. At that time, it did not bother anyone in Hungary or abroad, and it does not have any statement in it now, either, which would endanger the territorial integrity of any of the neighboring countries. As a matter of fact, the autonomy efforts are in accordance with the positive practice laid down in European and other national documents.

In reply to how they are trying to dampen the increasing tension with the neighboring countries, Eorsi said: Hungarian diplomacy is willing to start talks with the Slovak and Romanian sides on a governmental and parliamentary level, and they have experienced the same willingness from those circles of the neighboring governments that are not interested in increasing the tension. Naturally, certain forces do exist both in Hungary and in the neighboring countries that are not interested in peaceful settlement. According to Eorsi, Hungarian diplomacy did not intend to scheme when it accepted the statement, its intentions were honest, and its arguments could be supported.

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Hungary: SZDSZ Politician on Constitutional Legislation

AU0608135196 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 3 Aug 96 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Miklos Haraszti by Imre Tompa; place and date not given: "There Is a Way Out of the Constitutional Dictatorship"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to publicist Miklos Harszti, former deputy of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], the continual amendment of the Constitution implies the possibility of constitutional dictatorship and the danger that Hungary might slide further east on the European map. By upsetting the all-party consensus on constitutional legislation in a coup-like manner, the leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] demonstrated its lack of commitment to the change of the regime.

[Tompa] In one of your recent articles, you claim that the fiasco of the constitutional legislation is the first spectacular and dangerous victory of the "etatist" trade union left wing within the MSZP over the party's pragmatic reformers, and that it could lead to chaos. What would you say to those who would call this raising of the constitutional legislation's failure to the level of historical perspectives an exaggeration, because we do not have a constitutional emergency?

[Haraszti] Technically this is true, but we do have a constitutional emergency in a political sense. This is different from 1989, when the party state's parliament, confirming the results of talks between the opposition and the party, made the Constitution suitable for holding free elections. We now have a different political necessity. The continual tinkering with the Constitution implies the possibility of a constitutional dictatorship. If the government majority keeps amending the Constitution without the opposition's support and in accordance with the needs of governing, it exercises constitutional dictatorship, the way it is done by [Slovak Prime Minister] Meciar, [Belarusian President] Lukashenka, or Yeltsin. If the opposition comes to power, it will do the same in the opposite direction. And this will mean a deterioration of democracy.

[Tompa] In what will the deterioration of democracy be manifested?

[Haraszti] The system will not collapse, but Hungary will slide a little bit further to the east on the European map. Technically, the whole system will remain the same, we will have parties, parliament, and interest protection organizations, but we will be written off like the countries of Meciar, Lukashenka, or Yeltsin, which are democracies technically and formally, but are in fact constitutional dictatorships. The special characteristic of Hungarian democracy—that there is consensus between the government parties and the opposition as regards the Constitution, and the left and right wings consider the linking factors more important than the dividing ones—which made it different from others, will disappear.

[Tompa] At what moment will this consensus break?

[Haraszti] The moment they start to remake the Constitution by using the power and relying on the two-thirds majority, and excluding the opposition. If we managed to create the new Constitution through a consensus between the government and the opposition, this would prove that the Hungarian democracy is a true and not only formal-technical democracy. Rather than the market economy's performance, it is precisely this consensus that is the essence of democracy. For example, at the moment Meciar's Slovakia is producing better economic results than Hungary, but on the political map it still lies further to the east than we do. If we do not manage to join the West then we will not be able to create prosperity, either.

[Tompa] Did this consensus break up with the vetoing of the constitutional legislation?

[Haraszti] Precisely. The fact that the MSZP's leadership upset the all-party consensus in a couplike manner demonstrated a lack of commitment to the tradition of change of the regime.

[Tompa] What is the prime minister's role in vetoing the constitution?

[Haraszti] The prime minister does not have an ardent commitment to self-restriction anyway.... In addition, strong interests must have influenced him if he, who can see the need for joining the West more clearly than politicians who call themselves civic, was willing to prevent this constitutional legislation.

[Tompa] What are these interests?

[Haraszti] These are the interests of the trade union bureaucracies, which are not interested in denationalization. There are virtually no trade unions in the denationalized economy that has been set up since the change. To put it simply, two kinds of major trade unions exist: One of them tries to save the loss-making state enterprises. The other type is represented in the various trade unions of public employees. Their top bureaucracy is the only continuously surviving interest alliance of the state sector. The two etatist groups together do not even represent a quarter of the employees, and they are not interested in solving the two major tasks of our times, namely ridding ourselves of state ownership and removing redistribution from the state (this is the oft-mentioned re-

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form of state administration). Without reform we will never have a job-creating economy or rich public employees.

[Tompa] In what concrete forms did the trade union lobby intervene in constitutional legislation?

[Haraszti] They wanted to have it laid down as a basic right, namely as a right that can be enforced by the courts, that the private sector companies also have to agree with them. This might be the most important one. As they cannot organize the workers, they want to guarantee their presence at the workplaces with the help of state enforcement. They are also demanding a constitutional veto right for the trade union top bureaucracies. All this would lead to a trade union state. Not mentioning the fact that their maintenance would have to be paid for by the budget, namely the taxpayers.

[Tompa] The process of constitutional legislation, the debate, and the all-party consensus have become incredibly unimportant. A few dozen deputies were debating the regulation principles of the Constitution, often in the absence of all government members. Does this not contradict what you say about the huge importance of consensus and constitutional legislation?

[Haraszti] I think this is normal. We have a new wording but we are not talking about a new constitution. Paradoxically, it is good if the constitutional process is an unimportant everyday event. The all-party consensus aimed at finalizing the constitution which had been created at the change of the regime, namely the improvement of a functioning constitution, in a package. This was a so-called conservative, nonreforming constitutional process, which removed the transitional nature. Its real aim was to end the danger of constitutional dictatorship arising from the lack of a new constitution and the constant tinkering. We should have overcome this problem, but we have not managed to do so.

[Tompa] Is there a way out?

[Haraszti] Yes, through some compromise. It is so important to get rid of this problem, the danger of constitutional dictatorship, namely the possibility of Weimarization-Balkanization, that everyone should yield. For example, the symbolic demands could be met. Welfare rights could be included in the constitution as state commitments, even if not as basic rights. However, those who hinder the constitutional legislation should abandon their demand to include the trade union bureaucracies as a basic right, because the constitution belongs to the change of the regime and the Hungarian Republic rather than to the Socialist Party. The freedom of interest protection is sacred, but trade union leaders should not move back into the state.

Hungary: MSZP Official Sees Need for 'Political Action Plan'

AU0608170596 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 6 Aug 96 p 5

[Interview with MSZP Executive Committee member Gyorgy Foldes by Szabolcs Szereto; place and date not given: "Foldes on the MSZP's Political Action Plan in Preparation—More Political Coordination Will Be Needed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The politics of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the Socialist-dominated government has to be determined by the implementation of the government program, rather than by the election preparations in the coming 18 months, Gyorgy Foldes, member of the MSZP's National Executive Committee, has told MAGYAR HIRLAP. A few weeks ago, the party's Executive Committee tasked Foldes with preparing a political action plan to last until the end of 1997.

[Szereto] Why did the MSZP find it important to draw up a political action plan?

[Foldes] The idea of the action plan arose from the need to define the tasks of the MSZP and the Socialist-dominated government in the coming year and a half, after the conclusion of the first phase of stabilization. The Executive Committee had full agreement that our politics had to be determined by the implementation of the government program, rather than by the election preparations, until the end of 1997. In the process of drawing up the action plan, we will try to define and plan the political steps linked to the economic decisions thought to be necessary. Maintaining the consistency of economic policy, ensuring a more just distribution of the burdens, and continuing the reforms are the most important tasks of the coming 18 months. We must decide which elements of the reform we want to implement by the end of next year. The reform of the pension system and health care will most certainly be part of it, which also affects the social insurance system. These measures require far-reaching political decisions. We must assess the social consequences of the measures planned and we also have to consider the necessary steps to maintain the level of incomes in real terms next year.

[Szereto] On the basis of the events of the last two years, outside observers could easily conclude that the Socialists, after coming to power, have been acting without a considered strategy so far. Is the political action plan in preparation intended to rectify this?

[Foldes] In the summer of 1994, when the government program was drawn up, there was a planned series of economic and social measures on the basis of which the Socialist-Liberal government started to function.

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The implementation of the economic crisis management program and making an overall social and economic agreement were the most important elements of this strategy. However, we have not been fully able to implement this action program.

[Szereto] Does the current action plan have elements linked to the tasks of the period following the 1998 elections?

[Foldes] The MSZP does not have secret scenarios in connection with what kind of political alliance or coalition we consider important after the elections. Now, in the middle of the election cycle, I find such debates pointless. Statements on the future coalition possibilities do not help us to concentrate on the current tasks.

[Szereto] Do you think that the statements to do with the coalition possibilities are linked with the latest coalition disputes, which erupted before parliament's summer recess, and with the shattered internal confidence?

[Foldes] Both the MSZP and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] have to draw their conclusions from the events of the past two years, because much more conscious political action is needed in the coming period. The MSZP's left wing and the SZDSZ's liberal world view are significantly different from each other and these ideological differences between the two parties cannot be made to disappear. We would like to be able to agree with our coalition partner on the most important tasks of the coming 18 months. Too many ideological debates have recently burdened the parties' relations. We need fewer ideological polemics and more political coordination in the coming months.

[Szereto] According to some, it is quite good for the government and the MSZP that the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP] has become the parliamentary opposition's strongest force. How does the Socialists' action plan take the opposition into account?

[Foldes] In my view, the parliamentary opposition is struggling with a serious identity crisis, because with its basically right-wing ideological background and need for identification, it often attacks the government from the left. The opposition is constantly criticizing the coalition, which does make many mistakes but, at the same time, a credible governing alternative cannot be seen behind these attacks. For me it is perfectly natural that the MSZP sees the Jozsef Torgyan-led FKGP as its main political opponent, because this party, ignoring reality, is trying to gather political capital from the social dissatisfaction, it represents a distinctly anti-modernization and anti-integration policy, and it clearly questions the correctness of the current government's good-neighborly policy. Therefore, tactical elements do not influence our policy in connection with the FKGP. It might be advantageous for the MSZP if the Torgyan-led Smallholders lead the opposition's alternative in 1998. Regardless of this, I believe that it would be to the country's benefit if a moderate right-wing political axis could be organized.

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B-H: Prime Minister Muratovic on International Relations

AU0408200296 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 27-28 Jul 96 pp 4-5

[Interview with Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Fadil Mandal; place and date not given: "We Rely on the United States, the European Union, and Islamic Countries"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We talked to Prime Minister of the Republic Hasan Muratovic at a time when Bosnia-Herzegovina, after a short break, once more became the focus of the international and political attention. Less than two months before the general elections, in a period of only ten days, significant events took place that concern the future and the destiny of the Bosnian state. This is why the time we had at our disposal was too short for all the questions that we had planned to ask Muratovic. We received answers to the most interesting ones.

[Mandal] A few days ago, as our country's representative, you attended the opening of the Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta. Was that the only reason for your trip to the United States?

[Muratovic] Before Atlanta I had many meetings in Washington. First at the World Bank concerning our relations, which got somewhat complicated concerning a credit of $100 million, which is very important for our budget. With the U.S. Administration I had seven meetings altogether, the most important of which were with Mr. Tarnoff and Mr. Lipton [not further identified] at the State Department; then with several influential senators; and with some distinguished members of the Republican and the Democratic parties.

[Mandal] Did you meet President Clinton?

[Muratovic] I met the President of the United States immediately before the opening of the Olympic Games, and only briefly. We exchanged opinions on some very important questions related to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and since my presence in the United States coincided with the stay of Richard Holbrooke in Sarajevo, Belgrade and Zagreb, we also simultaneously influenced the course of his mission.

[Mandal] You have been at the head of the Republic Government for over half a year. How satisfied are you personally with the realization of the government's program in that period?

[Muratovic] I am satisfied in some areas, and not in others. Principally I am satisfied with what we have done toward forming projects and organization, and on collecting donations and credits for the economic reconstruction of the country—which is what we most work on. I believe that we have done a lot concerning the question of refugees, particularly concerning the project of the reconstruction of apartments, which is being successfully realized with the help of the UNHCR.

Much has been done on the creation of state institutions, except those for finances and international trade. Unfortunately, an international arbiter will deliberate on this problem.

[Mandal] What are you not satisfied with?

[Muratovic] I am not satisfied with the development of the institutions in the Federation, which should have taken over the work from the state. We have transferred some competences to them, but they have not fully developed in the Federation.

There is also the solution of social problems. Although they are nominally in the competence of the Federal Government, the state cannot give them up, because they are a precondition for its functioning and for the creation of confidence among the citizens—that the state is able to help them.

Changes in the Diplomacy

[Mandal] What about the reorganization in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Muratovic] That process has already started, but there are many obstructions to its realization. It is very hard to remove people from abroad, and it is as hard to appoint new ones.

[Mandal] Media have already speculated with names. Can you give us some concrete changes in the Bosnian diplomacy?

[Muratovic] These days at the session of the government we have given proposals for the appointment of a number of ambassadors, and we have removed some. For example, our ambassador in Brussels has already come here, and Professor Filipovic has also come back from London. Then we have also abolished two ambassador posts in Vienna, to the United Nations and to the OSCE, and we are attaching them to our embassy in that city.

[Mandal] What about the embassy in Bonn?

[Muratovic] We have sent a decision for Ambassador Ajanovic to return from Bonn, we have given him a specific deadline. A large number of staff from all embassies will also be withdrawn. In the first group there will be 80 of them; some have already returned, and the final deadline is 1 September. After that the second group of 80 employees has a month and a half

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to come back, which means that over two thirds of the staff in the embassies will be changed.

[Mandal] When will the new ambassadors in Washington, Budapest, Rome, and other places that belong to Croats be appointed?

[Muratovic] The Presidency may this week appoint the ambassadors in Budapest, the Vatican, Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Rome.... On the other hand, we will not allow all of them to take over their posts before we have come to state border of Bosnia-Herzegovina with mixed staff, which will include both Croats and Bosniaks. [sentence as published] That is a package that was agreed to in Vienna over a year ago.

War Criminals

[Mandal] These days domestic and foreign media have been writing about the removal of a major obstacle that impedes the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement; Radovan Karadzic has been removed from all state and political posts. Do you think that his departure came too late?

[Muratovic] That departure is not the solution for us. The real and just solution for us is his departure to The Hague, to the War Crimes Tribunal, but that does not refer to him only.

What about other war criminals from the Serb Republic, Croatia, and "Herzeg-Bosnia"? Croats have not extradited their war criminals either, although at least six have been accused in The Hague.

We cannot count on the advance of the Dayton peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina as long as all those people are not extradited to The Hague, because they do not allow the establishment of normal institutions, the functioning of the Federation, and also the future of the Serb Republic, and in that way of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

War criminals have a lot of influence on economic development in this region, and through them they exercise their political influence. In fact, some high politicians here already behave like their spokesmen.

[Mandal] As the former president of the State Committee for Relations With the United Nations you had contacts with Momcilo Krajisnik, who today—in many people's opinion—is the first man of the Serb Republic. What is his realistic political power right now?

[Muratovic] First, he has still not been accused of war crimes, but together with Karadzic he was responsible for the main ideas and activities that went on in the past four years. But, if he is not indicted by The Hague, and if he is chosen on the next elections, we will have to cooperate with him.

Today he surely has the most influence in Pale, but I expect the elections in the Serb entity to bring in some new people.

[Mandal] Is there any ground for the speculations that Richard Holbrooke, in his talks with Milosevic, also included the question of Brcko, that is, that it was the concession given to the president of Serbia for his pressure on and the removal of Karadzic?

Arbitration and Brcko

[Muratovic] I do not think that there will be any bargaining over Brcko. I think that will be solved by arbitration, as has been foreseen in the Dayton agreement. As far as we are concerned, we are very well prepared for that work.

[Mandal] There is now a new crisis in Mostar, provoked by the refusal of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] to accept the results of the June elections.

[Muratovic] Last Wednesday, when the situation in Mostar got very complicated, we had direct contacts with the United States and the European Union. We believe that the question of Mostar should still be solved by the European Union, because it has been involved in that problem from the very beginning.

Its withdrawal would mean that it surrendered before a group of war profiteers, before the Mafia in the western part of the city, which rules the black market. They by no means want the legal authorities according to the election results to be established, because in that way the war profiteers, who actually rule the entire [self-proclaimed Croat republic of] "Herzeg-Bosnia," would start losing their positions.

[Mandal] Do you believe that the European Union will eventually withdraw?

[Muratovic] If the elections are not accepted, they will most probably withdraw. You should know that the European Union planned to invest 40 million ekis [euros?] in Mostar beginning in October, which is a lot of money. They recently asked me what the reaction of the Croat side would be if they withdrew that money. I answered that in that way only we could be damaged, because they can collect 40 million in a month and a half, with their taxes and border control.

Problems in Mostar

[Mandal] Does our government have contacts with Croatia regarding the problems in Mostar?

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[Muratovic] We have contacts on the level of members of the government. We do not want to raise them to a higher level concerning Mostar, because we do not want Croatia to govern this city in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to rule it. That is our internal problem and the problem of the international community, and Croatia can be involved in the solution of that problem only within that community. And that is where its role is decisive.

[Mandal] A German paper, DER SPIEGEL, once accused you of Islamic fundamentalism and declared you to be an advocate of firmer ties with Iran. What are your real views of the development of relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Islamic world?

[Muratovic] First, when a paper in Germany writes that someone is an advocate of fundamentalism, then it is good if they write that that is me, because everybody knows how unrealistic that is, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In its foreign policy Bosnia-Herzegovina relies on the so-called tripod, the United States, the European Union, and the Organization of Islamic Countries.

We have very good relations with all of them, we wish to keep them and we expect help from all of them. Our country belongs to Europe and it is our goal to become a member of the Council of Europe, the European Union, and NATO very soon. At that, we are also aware that without the United States there could be no stable peace in this region, and without its economic help no fast reconstruction. Not to mention their political influence in general.

Of course, it is our goal to have good relations with the Islamic world too, and we do not hide that. We belong to the Islamic religion, we have a part of that culture. Islamic countries help us politically and economically.

[Mandal] What is the present situation regarding programs and credits for the reconstruction of the economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Sometimes it can be heard that there is money but there are no qualitative programs.

[Muratovic] There are two things. There are programs for which money has come. These are programs that we have created together with the World Bank and the European Bank for Economic Development. For those projects money is available, they are being realized and we are satisfied for the most part with that realization. Around $250 million have been engaged for that purpose by now.

On the other hand, there are credit lines that are a part of the contract with the World Bank, and a part of the help from the donors' conference. For example, the United States has opened a credit line of $60 million for economy. For those two kinds of credit lines there are not enough programs; they are either not well done, or there are not enough of them.

Public Works

[Mandal] Recently you asked that some directors of the projects made with the World Bank be removed.

[Muratovic] Yes, that is true. They did not fulfill the deadlines which had been firmly determined when those program directors were appointed.

[Mandal] Has any one been removed in the meantime?

[Muratovic] Only one has as yet been replaced.

[Mandal] Does that satisfy you?

[Muratovic] I would not want to talk about that, because that is not in my competence; those directors "belong" to the Federation. But, on Wednesday I received a report from Mr. Sullivan from the World Bank that says that at the moment they were satisfied with the realization of the projects, which is very important.

[Mandal] Recently in Dubrovnik you signed some important business projects with U.S. Secretary of Trade Mickey Kantor and the Croatian Prime Minister Zlatko Mates.

[Muratovic] Yes, that refers in the first place to two highways, or rather three, since one of them does not go through our state. They are the highways from Zagreb to Split, a great part of which goes through Bosnia-Herzegovina; then from Ploce to Metkovic and from Metkovic via Sarajevo to the Sava River. Whether that will be Brcko or Bosanski Samac, that depends on the arbitration for Brcko. These are major projects that can greatly influence the economic relations between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

They should engage many workers, and the works will have the character of public works. The United States will have a decisive role in securing the financial means for these projects and help in their organization.

Relations With the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

[Mandal] Our state delegation visited Belgrade. Some Croatian circles are very unsatisfied and, one could say, nervous because of the opening of the dialogue between Sarajevo and Belgrade.

[Muratovic] That visit has two aspects, the political and the economic one, and they are always interrelated. The political aspect can be viewed both positively and negatively, and in the economic aspect that is absolutely good. We must open up to the east because we do not control our border to the west either. The Croats from

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the Federation do not let us control the border to Croatia, and we must open up to Serbia.

Of course we do not want to make another "Herzeg-Bosnia" from the Serb Republic. I do not want to trade with Serbia through the Serb Republic, as some bad merchants of ours do, who buy goods in the western part of Mostar, Posusje, or Grude, and in that way make business with Slovenia or Croatia, which is fatal for us. It is our strategy to avoid that situation.

[Mandal] Finally, let us go to some preelection topics. How come you are on the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] list for the state parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Muratovic] I was asked by the president of the party if I wanted to take the leading position on one of the lists. I said yes, if that would help the party and this which we have been doing together for four years now, and that they could put me on any list. That was the whole conversation.

[Mandal] How do you evaluate the chances of your list on the elections in September?

[Muratovic] Whatever I start in my life, I do not only want to participate, but to win. That means that my chances are to win [sentence as published].

[Box, p 5]

Relations With Liberals

[Mandal] Before the lists of candidates were published, there was some speculation about your close relations with the Liberal Party.

[Muratovic] It is true that I am very close to the Liberal Party, but until the last moment the Liberal Party negotiated on a coalition with the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina. If they had negotiated with me and with the SDA, maybe we would have entered such an alliance. That is my opinion. I have not consulted the SDA about that, but I know political tendencies well enough.

[Box, p 5]

Serbs in Sarajevo

[Mandal] In the last month in the world media there were strong criticisms of the behavior of the Bosnian authorities in the reintegrated areas of Sarajevo. There is talk of the bad situation of the Serb population which has remained there, and the weak protection by the local police. How much exaggeration and how much truth is there in those stories?

[Muratovic] During my recent visit to the United States I was a guest at the CNN and I gave several interviews, and that is exactly what every journalist asked me. It is sad that people write about such minor incidents, and that they write so little about the major tragedies that took place in Srebrenica, Prijedor, Brcko, and in Sarajevo itself, and at the beginning of the war in its suburbs which have now been reintegrated.

These days I personally have been engaged with the final solution of that problem. The truth is that there are many minor incidents and that there is no big crime at all. That is said in the official reports of the international police. Most reports come from the domain of insults and petty thefts. We shall reduce those incidents to the minimum. The biggest number of those incidents is provoked by drunken people. I told the officials of the international police that those drunken people would cause similar incidents in peace as well, ten years ago.

On the other hand we have to keep our policy of multiethnic Bosnia and we must show that we do not copy the Pale regime in anything. We must solve this problem urgently with the help of the local population and we will certainly do that. We will not sacrifice the principles for which we fought throughout the war and which are known to the whole world, because of a few tens or hundreds of troublemakers.

[Box, p 5]

Strikes Do Not Solve Anything

[Mandal] Strikes of miners and health workers have taken place lately, and war invalids have also protested publicly.

[Muratovic] The way in which they are trying to solve their problems is wrong. And it can be brought in connection with the elections! As for the strike of health workers, I have sent them a letter which I have not published, in which I told them that that was the wrong way, that a strike would not solve anything and that their requests in the present time and the present situation were unrealistic.

They said they work very hard and have low salaries, I told them that that is true, but that there are many people in Bosnia-Herzegovina who have no work and no salary.

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B-H: Muratovic, Kapetanovic Sign Agreements With World Bank

AU0608160596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 6 Aug 96

[Report by Miralem Kruskic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kruskic] The signing of several subsidiary agreements and [words indistinct] the transfer of World Bank loans from the Republic to the Federation was completed today in the presence of numerous World Bank officials and Republic and Federation representatives. The signing took place in amid great ceremony. The agreements pertain to the reconstruction of housing, public works [words indistinct], and the urgent demobilization project and reintegration. It was stressed that funds for the reconstruction of the electricity network were being transferred to the public companies Elektroprivreda and Tuzla Coal Mines. After the signing ceremony, the Republic Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic was the first to address journalists:

[Muratovic] Last week we signed five new loan agreements with the World Bank. These include loans for the urgent reconstruction of the electricity network, to support demobilization and reintegration, public works and employment, urgent reconstruction of housing, and mine clearance. The projects are worth $413 million, of which the World Bank is providing $80 million. The rest should come from donations that were announced at two [word indistinct] conferences [words indistinct]. This confirms that the World Bank is the most active participant in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I believe that you yourselves have seen that the World Bank's consistent presence is securing a dynamic that is enabling us to secure cooperation with the World Bank. [sentence as heard] The internal agreements signed today will allow us access to funds tomorrow. The signed agreements mean that the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina is transferring these loans to the Federation, which is going to supervise the actual work.

[Kruskic] Prime Minister Izudin Kapetanovic addressed journalists on behalf of the Federation:

[Kapetanovic] So far, we have signed agreements for (?12) loans, which include the five signed today, that is, which were approved in Washington last month. I would like to remind you that the projects pertain to urgent reconstruction, revival of (?farm) production, reconstruction of the waterworks, revival of education, transport, the rehabilitation of war victims, and the reconstruction of central heating, which makes 12 World Bank projects. The overall funds needed for all the agreements signed so far amount to $965 million, of which the World Bank is providing $242 million. Since the Federation is authorized to implement the projects, today we signed [word indistinct] agreements and transferred funds from the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Federation. It is important to stress that today's signing of the subsidiary agreements has made funds accessible immediately and the implementation and realization of the projects can begin at once.

[Kruskic] World Bank official Mr. Rory O'Sullivan was the last to address journalists. He expressed great satisfaction that the [words indistinct].

[O'Sullivan in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] Never in the history of the World Bank have I seen such a large-scale and rapid realization of loans as during the past (?several months) in Bosnia. [end recording]

B-H: Deputy Defense Minister 'Optimistic' About Joint Army

AU0408! 2396 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jul 96 p 4

[Interview with Hasan Cengic, deputy minister of defense of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Eldin Karic; place and date not given: "Military Savings Account Books Nontransferable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We spoke with Hasan Cengic, deputy minister of defense of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, about the Defense Law of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and problems remaining following its passage; about the details of the recently signed contract with MPRI [Military Professional Resources, Inc.], the U.S. agency for training, regarding the "Train and Equip" program for the federal army; and about some of the Ministry of Defense's obligations and decisions, for which many citizens of the Federation have been waiting impatiently.

[Karic] The Defense Law has been passed, and the contract with the MPRI signed, which will officially launch the "Train and Equip" program for the federal army. Many people are skeptical about the ability of the joint military forces of Bosniaks and Croats to function smoothly together. What is your prediction?

Joint Army

[Cengic] The Defense Law and the contract with MPRI represent a very good foundation for the joint army. There can hardly be a better basis, which is, for me, reason enough to be optimistic. Technically, there is nothing to prevent the federal army from functioning smoothly; the rest will be decided by the political will. I believe that it will enable us to proceed with the establishment of the joint military forces. What is

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important and what is the basis of the joint army, is the fact that the Defense Law is a unique legal regulation in the domain of defense on the territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina; this is the main precondition for any further integration of the army. As for MPRI, it is their task to work on the joint training of the members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. MPRI will also work within the Ministry of Defense, with the members of both nations. All that should last for one year, and that time will be critical for integration. I believe that we have a good basis for integration.

[Karic] The United States is the sponsor and the mentor of the "Train and Equip" program. What other countries participate or want to participate in this program?

[Cengic] At the moment they are, beside the United States, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Turkey, Malaysia, and Brunei. We do not know if anybody else will join, but the program is open to everybody.

Concrete Help

[Karic] The U.S. adviser James Pardew said that some countries had already offered concrete help in terms of military equipment, the value of which is around one hundred million [currency not specified]. Do you know which countries those are?

[Cengic] According to my information, those countries are Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. I do not think that the quantity of weapons or equipment has yet been determined, but there has been some mention of the figure of around one hundred million [U.S.] dollars from these two countries.

[Karic] The Defense Law allows for recruits to express their preference as to where they wish to perform their military service. Can you tell us something more about the way in which that will be carried out?

[Cengic] In Article 96 of the Defense Law, it is written that recruits may express their preference as to where they would like to serve, if they were in the position to choose. That wish will be respected, except in cases when it does not serve the interests of defense in general. In that way, it is not a right, as the Croat side insisted, but an opportunity to express a wish, with the obligation of the ministry to fulfill that wish when possible.

[Karic] How likely are those wishes to be fulfilled?

[Cengic] The majority of preferences stated will be respected. That will always depend, however, on what the capacities of the training centers are and on the branch to which that recruit will be assigned.

That means that a Bosniak from Livno or Orasje can do his military service in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army—his request will be honored, just like the request of a Croat from Bihac who wishes to serve in the HVO will be honored.

Return of Mobilized Means

[Karic] What about the means which were mobilized during the war, and for which their owners are now requesting compensation?

[Cengic] All those requests have been received, and they are being checked. In cases when there is no longer any need for those means to be kept, they will be returned. We expect that, at least until the end of this year, we will be in the position to return all the means and the majority of property, particularly school property, which is under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

[Karic] What about the damages to those means or objects?

[Cengic] That will probably be up to the government to decide. We will try to inspect everything—that is, to determine the real damage, according to expert opinion. Exactly how compensation will be made will be agreed upon later. Because the immediate danger of war still exists and the state does not have any assets to pay off all its debts, it is not unreasonable that we may take into account the different positions of the claimants, so that we could pass a kind of prioritization measure, whereby we pay those who most need it. Of course, that does not mean that we will deny anyone the right to compensation for war damages, it is only a question of when the state will be in the position to secure the means with which to compensate those eligible.

The Army's Debts

[Karic] Will the revenue which some firms claim on the basis of contracts made with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry, be paid out, and if so, how?

[Cengic] That concerns a considerable amount of money, claimed by a large number of firms from Bosnia-Herzegovina. We expect that the government will soon find a way to settle these debts internally, and we believe in that way, we will be able to pay out considerable means and regulate the rest in some favorable form—in the form of credits, by giving special tax and customs privileges, and so on. In any case, their claims are solid, and they cannot be denied, but since in most cases these are state-owned firms, and their debt is also the debt of the state, then the state will have to decide in which way to settle it. I

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believe that a big part of those claims will be satisfied by the end of this year. [passage omitted]

[Karic] Has there been any consideration of the possibility for legal subjects [firms] to settle a part of their obligations towards the state through the military foreign currency account books of their workers, and in turn, for the workers to get those amounts in cash [sentence as published]?

[Cengic] That would be a good sign that our economy has become stronger and solvent, but I am afraid that it is not solvent and that it does not have the money with which it could do that. According to the law, it is very clear that only the owners of the account books can use those books, that they cannot be transferred in any way, except in court in the event of the death of the owner.

[Box, p 4]

Immediate War Danger Still Exists

The Government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina ordered the Ministry of Defense to prepare a proposal on the termination of the state of immediate danger of war. Regarding that, Deputy Minister of Defense Cengic said:

"We have already sent our answer to the government, in which we said that we believe it to be too early terminate the [state of] immediate war danger to be terminated, with regard to some very important facts of security and a danger of an increase of various criminal acts, as well as an obligation of the return of mobilized means." [sentence as published]

[Box, p 4]

Double Time Only for Soldiers

According to the Defense Law, for members of the armed forces of the Federation, time spent in the defense war will be counted as a special, double time, the so-called bonus time ["beneficirani staz"]. However, the law does not solve the problem for those who had a work obligation during the war. On that issue, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Federation Cengic said:

"The Ministry of Defense is responsible for ensuring that the members of the armed forces are paid, which involves calculating the duration of service, i.e. of the double working time. As for those who had a work obligation, that is not in the scope of the Defense Ministry. According to the Law on Salaries, it is not anticipated that the time they spent will be counted as double. They should discuss their rights with the institutions in which they had their work obligations."

[Box, p 4]

The Ministry Has Fulfilled Its Obligations

[Karic] What has been done up to now on the preparation of the regulations regarding the use of military foreign currency account books [account books issued as payment to soldiers who served in the army during the war]?

[Cengic] Many laws are being prepared—first of all, the law on the purchase of flats, which, according to my information, is about to be finished and we expect the government to discuss it during its next session. Within that law, there will be a clause which will address the rights of the members of the armed forces regarding the use of military foreign currency accounts. Also, I have been informed that the law on privatization is being prepared, which would enable the members of armed forces to buy land, forests, offices, and shares in state-owned firms. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for taking care of obligations toward members of the armed forces, and as for the D ase Ministry, it is responsible for the preparation of documents and for the issuing of certificates to every member detailing the exact amount of time they spent in the armed forces, which category they belonged to, and how much money they made. Until now we have issued over 160,000 foreign currency account books, we have prepared 200,000 certificates, and we expect to finish the others by the end of August. So in terms of the state's obligations toward members of the armed forces, we are no longer the responsible ones, nor are we responsible for the preparation of laws or their implementation. That's the responsibility of the government and the Ministry of Finance, and technically, the Economic Bank, Deputy Minister of Defense Hasan Cengic said.

B-H: Officials Warn of Harassment, Persecution by Croats

AU0508181396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The office of the vice president of the Federation has been informed by the human rights' officers of Cantons 7 and 10 about new cases of serious violations of the basic human rights of the Bosniaks in the Livno municipality and the western part of Mostar.

In the last three days in the area of the village of Grborezi near Livno several storage buildings belonging to Bosniaks have been set on fire. This represents a new form of forcing the Bosniaks to move out, since these arson attacks deprive them of the most basic means of survival. The expulsion and harassment of the Bosniaks

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in western Mostar is also continuing. The family of Senad Velic has been attacked and beaten up by six masked civilians. Nijaz Stolcinin's garages have been blown up. These terrorist acts have been carried out to scare the remaining Bosniaks in western Mostar into moving out.

In the areas of Capljina and Stolac the local authorities have been exerting pressure on the Croats displaced from Kakanj and Vares, telling them that they should settle in Stolac and Capljina permanently since there has allegedly been an agreement to exchange Stolac and Capljina for Kakanj and Vares.

The office of the federation vice president informs all the temporarily displaced people and refugees that there have been no agreements on the exchange of territories within the federation, and that the Croats from Kakanj and Vares should be prepared to return to their homes as well as return the homes where they are currently accommodated to their original Bosniak owners.

The human rights' officers have informed the High Representative's office, the U.S. and German Embassies, the UNHCR, and the international police about this propaganda and these terrorist acts, seeking their action in the protection of the basic human rights of the Bosniaks of Livno and Mostar.

B-H: IFOR Officials on 'Incidents,' Explosions in Mostar

AU0608155396 Paris AFP in English 1327 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 6 (AFP)—NATO forces stepped up patrols in Mostar overnight after a series of shooting incidents and explosions in the divided city, NATO officials said Tuesday.

Two blasts and several firing incidents were noted by troops serving with the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) patrolling the city overnight Monday, an IFOR official said. There were no casualties or damage reported in any of the events during the late hours of Monday and early Tuesday morning.

Three drunk Bosnian army soldiers were arrested and then released by their military police after a civilian police patrol was fired on, Major Brett Boudreau, an IFOR spokesman said.

Tracer fire observed from Croat-held Mostar west of the Muslim-controlled east of the city was held to be "undisciplined fire related to marking the anniversay of Operation Storm," Boudreau said.

Last August, the Croatian army mounted a successful offensive in neighbouring Croatia to take back Serb-held territory. Muslims and Croats in Mostar also fought two years ago in bitter clashes that divided the city.

Tensions remain over the Bosnian Croat refusal to join a democratically elected city assembly intended to reunite the southern Bosnian town.

IFOR military patrols were increased throughout the night, the spokesman said. IFOR also "issued instructions to the ABiH [Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina] and HVO [Croatian Defense Council] (Bosnian Croat forces) that they may not conduct traning in the vicinity of Mostar for the time being," Boudreau added.

B-H: Atmosphere 'Tense' in Mostar; 'Tide of Violence' Spreading

LD0608184196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1824 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 6 (TANJUG)—The long and difficult negotiations between Bosnian Muslims and Croats on the establishment of elected town authorities in Mostar, southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, were accompanied by a series of violent incidents threatening to turn into serious armed confrontations, Muslim Radio Mostar reported Tuesday.

A Muslim taxi driver was severely beaten Tuesday in the western—Croat—part of Mostar and his vehicle was demolished. According to the Croat radio, this incident was a reaction to the insolent behaviour of Muslims towards a delegation returning from an assembly of the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) in Neum, when the Croat flag was torn to pieces as the delegation entered the Muslim part of the town.

Two explosions resounded Monday night in the Croat part of Mostar, destroying two mechanic workshops—one Muslim and one Croat. The only crime of the workshop owners was that they dared to work on Monday, the thanksgiving day being celebrated in neighboring Republic of Croatia, Muslim Radio Mostar said.

The administration of the Croat part of Mostar was celebrating the day as its own holiday, as it does on the occasion of all holidays in Croatia, and the workshop owners were punished as a warning to all who think that western Mostar is not Croatia, the radio said.

A Croat member of the Muslim army was arrested Monday in western Mostar, and several Croat passers-by were immediately arrested in retaliation in eastern (Muslim) Mostar.

The atmosphere in Mostar is extremely tense and the tide of violence is spreading, Radio Mostar Warns.

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Croat Radio reported meanwhile that several Croat-owned shops and cafes were blown up Monday night in Bugojno, central Bosnia.

After several days of negotiations, Muslims and Croats reached agreement Tuesday on the establishment of a joint town administration. The Croats had been refusing to do this under the pretext of irregularity of local elections of last June 30.

B-H: Mostar Croat-Muslim Accord Detailed

LD0608163696 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1542 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Mostar, 6 Aug (BH PRESS/HABENA)—The Croat and Bosniak sides signed an agreement at about 1400 today setting up the Mostar city administration. The European Union [EU] mandate will come into effect under the name Joint Action, Dragan Gasic, EU spokesman in Mostar, told journalists.

The city council should meet in August, elect a mayor and deputy mayor, and after this the Supreme Court of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation should give its verdict in connection with the Croatian Democratic Union's allegations of electoral irregularities. Both sides called on their leaders to speed up the establishment and work of the federation court. According to Article 24 of the statue of the city of Mostar, the city council should meet at least every two months, so that the verdict of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation court is expected in the two months after the election of the mayor and his deputy, HABENA [Bosnian Croat news agency] reports.

The agreement further stipulates that the mayor and deputy mayor will cooperate closely with the special EU envoy. The mayor will be a Croat in view of the fact that the governor of Neretva County and the mayor of Mostar must be of different nationality.

B-H: East, West Mostar Mayors Comment on Agreement

LD0608165296 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Mijo Brajkovic, the mayor of west Mostar, was satisfied with the [Muslim-Croat] agreement [on Mostar], saying that it was a very important step toward regulating relations in the city of Mostar.

[Begin Brajkovic recording] I hope that the time for economic reconstruction is coming, so that people can start working. This is the most important thing for me. [end recording]

Brajkovic added that the first session of the city council would most probably be held in about 10 days. Safet Orucevic, the mayor of east Mostar, said among other things that Mostar had to be one city. The fate of Mostar is tied to the fate of the federation, he said, adding that the process of establishing the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] federation had to be accelerated.

B-H: Mostar Mayors, EU's Garrod Satisfied With Agreement

AU0608185496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 6 Aug 96

[Report by Mirsad Behram from Mostar—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Behram] The meeting of representatives of both sides, which everyone said would be the last one, began this morning at 1100 [0900 GMT] as announced earlier. Talks behind closed doors followed, and three and a half hours later, EU spokesman Dragan Gasic appeared before journalists and announced that today's round of negotiations had yielded results and that the sides had signed an agreement.

[Gasic] Thank God, following the recent series of meetings that lasted until 0400 in the morning, we have negotiated an agreement that both sides have signed.

[Behram] Spokesman Gasic then proceeded to read the text of the agreement. The agreement states, among other things, that the Croatian and Bosniak sides accept the extension of the EU mandate under the name Joint Action and pledge to cooperate with special envoy Martin Garrod.

The agreement has taken into consideration the Croatian Democratic Union's [HDZ] complaints about the elections in Bonn, that is, the party's complaint regarding the EU ombudsman's decision on the elections and the suit filed with the Federation Supreme Court. Both sides have called on their leaders to speed up the process of setting up the Federation Supreme Court. Moreover, the agreement envisages that the City Council sit in session in August to appoint a mayor and his deputy. After this, EU special envoy Martin Garrod addressed journalists:

[Garrod, in English with passage-by-passage translation into Serbo-Croatian] What will happen now is that a recommendation will be put to the EU Presidency. As you are aware, it is already past the deadline and, in fact, the legal action has already been taken by the EU for the mechanism to insert the rear party [sentence as heard in the English]; however, in light of this agreement, I hope and am confident that the EU Presidency and the EU nations will decide to resurrect the Joint Action of the special envoy.

[Behram] When asked why the agreement did not state 8 August as the day for holding the City Council session

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that the HDZ councillors should attend, Garrod said that, according to the Mostar Provisional Statute, three days were needed to prepare a session of the Council. As the agreement was signed on 6 August, that is, today, the envisaged time frame cannot be met.

Western Mostar Mayor Mijo Brajkovic expressed satisfaction that a phase in the Mostar process had been successfully completed.

[Brajkovic] Of course, many problems remain in the city and much is still to be done. However, I feel that we have made a great step forward when we established the city of Mostar.

[Behram] Asked if he had a message for Mostar refugees currently residing in third countries now that the agreement has been signed, Brajkovic said that the problem of refugees was not an isolated problem and that it needed a comprehensive solution. He also mentioned that the session of the city council could be expected to take place within the next 10 days.

Eastern Mostar Mayor Safet Orucevic also expressed satisfaction with the signed agreement and stressed the United States' and EU's crucial roles. Expressing hope that Joint Action would go into effect, Orucevic said:

[Orucevic] As far as the agreement is concerned, we are satisfied because the City Council's work will not be suspended and because we have found a solution according to which in line with the Mostar City Statute we can hold regular sessions. Moreover, each party has the right to file a suit with the courts regarding certain decisions. This has been included in this document. Mostar is a joint city and it cannot exist as such without an agreement.

[Behram] The collocutors assessed today's signing of the agreement as a step forward in the Mostar process. It remains to be seen whether this will prompt progress at the Federation level, since Mostar is considered to be the pilot project for the Federation.

B-H: West Mostar Mayor Discusses 'Temporary' Accord

LD0608182496 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Our guest this evening is in the Siroki Brijeg studio—Mayor of West Mostar Mijo Brajkovic. Good evening.

[Brajkovic] Good evening.

[Announcer] The agreement on joint action has been signed. Can you comment on it? Are you satisfied with it?

[Brajkovic] Yes, today we completed a very long process. I think that it is very good and that the Croat side and I personally can be satisfied with it.

[Announcer] The whole thing went for a long time. Was that necessary?

[Brajkovic] It was and it was not. It was because we had to put down on a piece of paper all possible problems in Mostar, our problems, the Bosniak side's, the European Union's [EU]. That is a process which went on for a long time, the EU has been in Mostar for more than two years and it should stay on for another six months. All this had to be put down in one document. From that point of view it had to take a long time.

On the other hand, perhaps it went on for too long because all sides tried to win something extra. We exhausted ourselves in the long negotiations that went on day and night. Perhaps we could have avoided that, but deep down I am satisfied because it has been completed to our satisfaction. Very good.

[Announcer] There has been a lot of talk about disputed points, but then it all boiled down to one disputed point. [passage omitted]

[Brajkovic] You know that there were some oversights concerning the rigging of the elections. We had to take this into consideration, all the documents we signed are of a temporary nature pending a decision of the federation's supreme court.

But the Croat side was cooperative in not blocking the political processes in Mostar, in continuing to work on it all while the court is doing its job until it is all definitively made public. Then we will do the whole thing again if need be.

[Announcer] Mr. Brajkovic. What will happen now? What do you expect?

[Brajkovic] As for the situation in Mostar today, we must choose a mayor now. As you probably know already, the mayor will be a Croat. We will convene a meeting of the town council this month to elect a mayor and deputy mayor.

After that, municipal assemblies will be set up. As you know, the Croat side has three municipalities which we will link up into one municipality and set up one council [opcinsko poglavarstvo]. I think this is the best thing that could happen. These municipalities will protect national, cultural, and religious identities of the Croat people in Mostar.

[Announcer] Mr. Brajkovic, thank you very much.

[Brajkovic] Thank you.

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B-H: SPRS Officials Reject Any 'Bargaining' Over Brcko

AU0708105296 Sarajevo ONASA in English 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brcko, northern Bosnia, 5 Aug (ONASA)—Senior officials of the Bosnian Serb opposition Socialist Party (SPRS) said on Sunday that there can be no bargaining about the key town of Brcko, because there can be no Republic of Srpska [Serb Republic] without Brcko.

Brcko is the key town in northern Bosnia that links two major parts of the Serb entity, and at the same time represents the only potential access to the Sava River for the Bosnian Federation. It has been under Bosnian Serb control since the beginning of the war, but given that the Bosniaks and Croats constituted prewar majority in this town, it will be subject to an arbitration.

At its first election campaign rally held in Brcko, SPRS president and its presidential candidate at the forthcoming elections in Bosnia, Zivko Radisic, SPRS candidate for vice president Nedjo Djuric and candidate for the Bosnian Presidency Mladen Ivanic told the gathered people that they strongly support the Republic of Srpska, and that they will fight for a modern and developed country which will have close ties with rump Yugoslavia.

Speaking about relations with neighboring countries, the SPRS officials said there should be cooperation with all neighbors, but only on an equal basis.

B-H: Witness Identifies Tadic as Being Present in Serb Camp

AU0608154596 Paris AFP in English 1507 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, Aug 6 (AFP)—For the first time in the trial of suspected war criminal Dusan "Dusko" Tadic, a witness at the UN international tribunal Tuesday [6 August] identified the accused as being at the Trnopolje detention camp in northwest Bosnia.

Bosnian Serb Tadic, 40, is accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. With the trial entering its 12th week, Tadic has until now denied ever having set foot in the camps where, according to the charges, he allegedly carried out atrocities.

Vasif Gutic, a 40-year-old Moslem who was a doctor at the Trnopolje camp from May to October 1992, told the tribunal that he saw Tadic come to the camp to deliver a document to the deputy commander. According to the witness, it was a list of prisoners arriving from Kozarac, Tadic's home town.

Tadic, who was accompanied by several others including his co-accused Goran Borovnica, then held a heated discussion with the deputy commander, Gutic told the court. He could not be sure of the date of the encounter.

The witness said he knew Tadic before the war as a karate instructor in Kozarac, and also as owner of a cafe where Borovnica worked as a waiter.

Earlier, Gutic had described the appalling living conditions in the Trnopolje camp, a former school converted by the Serbs into a detention camp for Moslems.

The doctor spoke for about 20 minutes on what he had been told by some detainees—the youngest of whom were 11 or 12 years old—raped by Serb guards.

The women were led in the evening to nearby houses were they were abused, he said. "When the rapes started, everyone lost hope," he said.

"We had a horrible fear of the night, and in my opinion one of the aims of this activity was to maintain this fear."

Tadic is accused of having killed 13 Moslems and tortured 18 others in the detention camps and during ethnic cleansing operations in the Prijedor region in northwestern Bosnia between May and December 1992.

B-H: Plavsic, Bildt Discuss Peace Agreement, POW Release

LD0608154596 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] In Banja Luka today, Biljana Plavsic, the vice president and acting president of the Bosnian Serb Republic, met Carl Bildt, the international community's high representative for the implementation of the peace agreement in the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The talks, held behind closed doors, focused on the implementation of the peace agreement provisions in connection with the release of remaining POW's, exhumation of mass graves, and other issues of implementing the Dayton Agreement. Velimir Bozic reports:

[Bozic] Every meeting with Mr. Bildt takes us forward, toward the realization of the Dayton agreement to which we are firmly committed. At those meetings we attempt to eliminate certain events and incidents that are obstacles on the road leading to the implementation of the agreement, Plavsic told Serb radio after her meeting with Bildt and added:

[Begin Plavsic recording] One very important thing from the Dayton agreement that should have been

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completed by 19 January is the release of prisoners. As far as the process of exhumation is concerned, there are a great number of mass graves in the area of Sanski Most, Prijedor, Glamoc, Ozren. You know from our press that this process is not being implemented as it should be. It is mainly in the humanitarian sphere, we are trying to exclude this from the political sphere. But, there is no doubt that such events also have an impact on some political solutions. [end recording]

[Bozic] Mrs. Plavsic invited Bildt to be a guest of Serb Television. By answering the viewers' questions, he could clarify the provisions of the Dayton agreement and its implementation. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb PM, Army Chiefs Discuss Defense of State

AU0608184496 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1705 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 6 Aug (BETA)—Gojko Klickovic and Miroslav Vjestica, prime minister and deputy prime minister of the Serb Republic (RS), today visited the main headquarters of the RS Army.

The Pale media, however, have not reported with whom Klickovic and Vjestica held talks.

At the meeting it was assessed that defense of the state is the primary task of both the civilian and the military structures of the RS, since the defense of the country represents the only guarantee of the survival of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Pale media report that the talks also concerned the implementation of the Dayton agreement. It was concluded that the Serb side had implemented all the military aspects of the agreement on time and consistently.

B-H: Serb Leadership Attacking Pale Military's Tolimir

AU0508143696 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 2 Aug 96 p 2

["Exclusive" report by an unidentified correspondent: "The KOS-Pale French Connection"]

[FBIS Translated Text] General Zdravko Tolimir, assistant chief of the general staff of the "Serb Republic" in charge of intelligence and security activities, is being attacked by the most influential Pale politicians. According to the prevailing opinion there, his activity is under the direct control of the State Security of Serbia and KOS [Counterintelligence Service] of the so-called Army of Yugoslavia headed by General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic. It is thought that this "link" is aimed at threatening these politicians' positions and bringing to power the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic, which would undermine the "independence of the Serb Republic" and would allegedly lead to the business of reintegrating the Serb entity into Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Pale politicians deem Tolimir "responsible" for handing over "for nothing" the two French pilots (Sife and Suvije [names as transcribed]) in the middle of last December. They think that there was a realistic possibility of getting territorial concessions in the Sarajevo suburbs in return. According to that version, Tolimir accepted Gen. Dimitrijevic's instructions to persuade Mladic at all costs that the exchange was necessary. And, according to information received from Belgrade's "patriotic" police circles, Dimitrijevic is known to be a French agent!

What is known for sure in connection with this presumption is that Dimitrijevic really did at one time attend school in France, and these "patriotic sources" quote an official document that, at that time, the French intelligence service on five occasions offered cooperation to Dimitrijevic, each of which he is supposed to have refused but the fifth.

The Pale leadership even connect Dimitrijevic with the assumptions that, on the basis of KOS data on Dr. Karadzic's movements, instead of U.S. units, the French Foreign Legion might carry out the operation of apprehending him. It is currently popular in Pale to compare Tolimir to Commander Kalabic [World War II Chetnik officer], who was instrumental in apprehending Draza Mihailovic [leader of the Chetniks].

B-H: Serb Prime Minister Denies Budget Irregularities

LD0308122696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1048 GMT 3 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 3 Aug (SRNA)—The government of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic today rejected, in a statement sent to SRNA from the office of Gojko Klickovic, prime minister of the Serb Republic, "irrational claims that budget funds are being siphoned off to the detriment of individual regions."

Recalling that [Bosnian] Serb television is the only station in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina to give access to all parties, the government believes that "such attacks and especially inaccurate statements," cannot not be accepted.

The statement says the alleged actions would in practice be "impossible to carry out because all items are strictly checked and funds are earmarked only on the basis of the budget plan."

It was pointed out in particular that "money is distributed to public funds, and some of these are decen-

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tralized, which gives the regions in the Serb Republic great scope for taking advantage of funds for development."

Finally, the statement highlights the damage caused by such announcements by individual parties "because our adversaries see in regional conflicts a great opportunity to sow discord among us, threatening the foundations of the Serb Republic."

B-H: Krajisnik Says 'Regular' Elections Necessary for Stability

LD0508154196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1432 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 5 Aug (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Bosnian Serb Republic, held talks in Pale today with Jeff Beaumont, the head of the Pale office for liaison with the special envoy of the UN secretary general, on the forthcoming elections in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In a statement after the talks Krajisnik warned that the international community and the Croat-Muslim side were exerting too much pressure to complicate the elections or even cause them not to be held at all; the Serbs would then be blamed for this failure.

"We are no more or less interested in the elections than the other side, but we want them to be held in order to eliminate the traditional policy of blaming the Serb side," Krajisnik added.

Krajisnik expressed his concern over the possibility of abuse of the electorate, particularly in view of the proposal that elections for citizens of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina living abroad be held 10-14 days before 14 September—then there was a possibility of them coming to Bosnia and voting again.

"We will offer certain suggestions and proposals in this respect and demand certain corrections from the UN representatives so that the elections are as regular as possible, which would make the overall situation more stable," the speaker said.

Commenting on the Croat-Muslim disputes, Krajisnik said that it was possible that the tense situation in the federation would reflect on the Serb Republic, just as the war in Croatia transferred to the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The speaker of the Serb Republic appealed to the Serb people to be united and to do everything to realize its aspiration to preserve the Serb Republic and to isolate itself from the Croat-Muslim federation as much as possible.

B-H: Serb Government Blames 'Splinter Groups' for Bomb Attacks

LD0608194496 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with accusations by some splinter groups in the [Bosnian] Serb Republic against the state and the [ruling] Serb Democratic Party [SDS], the government of the Serb Republic today dissociated itself from the attacks on, and incidents involving, [word indistinct] parties which have failed to impose their will on the Serb people.

In a statement for SRNA, the government of the Serb Republic pointed out that the state authorities already have sufficiently reliable information that individuals and some parties are themselves planting bombs and other devices to contribute to the efforts of international factors to eliminate the Serb Republic.

These parties, which have branches in Belgrade, are contributing to the creation of a climate favoring the postponement of the [14 September] elections. This is in the interests neither of Serbia nor of the Serb Republic, the statement issued by the government of the Serb Republic warns.

Dissociating itself from all the incidents, the government of the Serb Republic has ordered all state authorities to uncover those to blame, to punish them in an exemplary fashion, and to inform the public.

B-H: Serbs Submit Charges to Hague War Crimes Tribunal

AU0508180996 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 30 Jul 96 p 5

[Interview with Goran Neskovic, deputy minister of justice of the Serb Republic, by Boro Maric; place and date not given: "A Crime in 300 Indictments"]

[FBIS Translated Text] So far the Serb Republic has handed over 300 cases to the International Tribunal in The Hague, with proof of war crimes committed against the Serb people during the recent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

According to research results, 2,300 Serbs in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina are victims of war criminals—members of the military and police forces of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republic of Croatia.

According to Goran Neskovic, deputy minister of justice of the Serb Republic, the International Tribunal for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia has still not responded to the submitted materials.

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"The court has formed several 'cases' based on our materials, and in accordance with its customary practice. But it has not opened an investigation, nor has it accused anyone yet," Neskovic pointed out.

The first "case" pertains to Naser Orlic, the commander of the Muslim forces in Srebrenica. He and his subordinate commanders and soldiers are suspected of having committed war crimes against the Serb population in Podrinje, and throughout the area of Srebrenica.

The second "case" concerns materials that contain information on war crimes against the Serbs in the villages of Jabuka, Bukvik, and Josanice, in the vicinity of Gorazde. Those responsible for the crimes are Ferid Buljubasic, a commanding officer of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Hadzo Efendic, the leader of the Party of Democratic Action.

Graves Without Names

"The third 'case' was formed on the basis of documentation on the killings of Serbs in Sarajevo. Unfortunately, the Serb Republic Commission for establishing war crimes was not able to accomplish much on this territory, because the witnesses of crimes against the Serbs are few, and the territory on which these crimes were committed was constantly controlled by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina," Neskovic explained.

However, it has been established that on the garbage dump in the township of Pofalici 120 Serbs had been slaughtered and buried, that a large number of Serbs had been killed in the locality of Kazan, and that Serbs had been killed and buried in the area between the "trnovska cesta" and the airport.

"Some of the Serbs killed were buried at the Lav cemetery and the cemetery of St. Francis. At the St. Francis cemetery the Muslims were digging up the graves, but they did not manage to destroy all traces of the crimes committed by their soldiers and police," Neskovic said.

The fourth "case" pertains to the area of Brod, Derventa, and Odzak.

"For us this 'case' is very important, because it confirms that the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina did not begin in Sarajevo in April of 1992, but in Brod on 3 March. The first crime against the Serb population was committed in the village of Sijekovac, near Brod, on 27 and 28 March 1992. Those most responsible for the atrocities in Sijekovac are Armin Pohara and Blazan Kljajic, and for the crimes against the Serbs in Odzak, Bozo Matanovic," Neskovic said.

He emphasized that the pathologist of the Hague Tribunal was also present when they dug out the mass grave in Mrkonjic-Grad, from which the bodies of 181 Serb soldiers and civilians were taken out. It was ascertained that the majority of those people were killed in the most brutal way after surrendering or being captured.

"No one has yet been accused of these crimes against the Serbs in Mrkonjic-Grad, although we know the names of the victims, we know how they were killed, and we know that the local commander of the Croat troops was Damir Krsticevic, commander of the Fourth Guard brigade of the Croatian Army," Neskovic pointed out.

By Order of the Chief

Among those who have also been listed as war criminals against the Serb people in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina are Alija Izetbegovic, president of the pro-Muslim Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Dr. Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Presidency; Sefer Halilovic, former commander in Chief of the General Army Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and his successor, General Rasim Delic.

On the list of war criminals are also Jusuf Pusina, the first minister of internal affairs of the pro-Muslim Government in Sarajevo; Dragan Vikic, commander of special police units called "Laste"; and Enver Hadzihasanovic, the first commander of the Third Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"It was established that Alija Izetbegovic had visited the prisoner-of-war camp in Celebici, near Konjic. He therefore knew about the existence of that camp. How is it possible that the former commander of the camp, Zdravko Mucic, and his deputy Zejnil Delalic were accused in The Hague, and Alija Izetbegovic is innocent?" Neskovic said.

"He particularly pointed out that the participation of the regular Croatian army units in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was indubitably ascertained, as well as their crimes against the Soperation between the Tribunal and the Serb Republic will be seriously jeopardized," Neskovic said.

[Box, p 5]

Without Protection

The International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague received all the verdicts of the courts in the Serb Republic, pronounced against Serbs for crimes, including war crimes, against the Muslims and Croats. Courts in the Serb Republic also conducted, and are still conducting, trials against a certain number of Muslims and Croats accused of war crimes against the Serbs. This means

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that the objections raised that the Serb Republic and its courts are protecting war criminals, are not valid.

[Box, p 5]

Mara Rujevic Is Identified

The identification of 42 bodies of Serbs killed began in Banja Luka yesterday. The bodies were exhumed on 16 July from the mass grave in the village of Kamen, three kilometers east of Glamoc in the direction of Livno.

For the present, the only person identified was Mara Rujevic, born in 1915, from Vidovo Selo, near Drvar.

Dr. Zeljhe's identification log states that Mara Rujevic was killed by a blow on the head with an object and that death had ensued as the result of a broken 2d cervical vertebra, multiple fractures of the lower jaw, and multiple fractures in the area of the face.

The identification of the remaining 41 bodies will be continued today.

In the mass grave in the village of Kamen, 65 bodies of Serb soldiers and civilians killed have still not been exhumed, and the exhumation, interrupted on 16 July, was not continued because of the obstruction of the Croat authorities, in spite of four attempts of the Serb Republic's state Commission for the exchange of prisoners of war and missing persons, to have it continued.

The exhumation is conducted in the presence of representatives of the international police and IFOR, as well as two experts appointed by the United Nations.

[Box, p 5]

Missing

"The number of 2,300 Serbs, victims of war crimes, unfortunately is not final. Thousands of Serbs, particularly from Sarajevo, are listed as missing and we have serious indications that these people are no longer alive. Also precarious is the fate of Serbs listed as missing from the area of Zenica, Visoko, and other municipalities that during the war were under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]," Neskovic said.

[Box, p 5]

No Extradition

Before his departure yesterday to join the negotiations with the representatives of the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, Marko Arsovic, minister of justice in the Serb Republic gave the following statement to NOVOSTI:

"The Serb Republic is in favor of full cooperation with the international community and its institutions, among them the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. That cooperation is possible only if both sides adhere to the legal framework established by the international community and to local laws."

Asked whether the Serb Republic would extradite Dr. Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, Arsovic said:

"The Constitution and the laws of the Serb Republic do not allow the extradition of its citizens to other countries, which includes the court of the United Nations, which is not itself a state, but an association of sovereign states. According to the Dayton agreement, laws that would enable the extradition of Dr. Karadzic and Gen. Mladic cannot be brought by the Serb Republic, but solely by the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will be formed only after the September elections."

In addition to Arsovic, the delegation that went to The Hague includes Goran Neskovic, deputy minister of justice of the Serb Republic, and their counselor, Belgrade attorney Igor Pantelic.

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Croatia: Tudjman Leaves for Talks With Milosevic in Athens

LD0708082696 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0700 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Franjo Tudjman left for Greece this morning at the invitation of [Greek] Prime Minister Konstandinos Simitis. Before leaving for Athens, where he is expected to meet with Serbian President Milosevic, President Tudjman made a brief statement. Drazen Korda reports:

[Korda] Asked about the significance of the meeting in Athens, President Franjo Tudjman, said:

[Begin Tudjman recording] The Dayton Agreement brought about a cease-fire. Since then intensive diplomatic and political efforts have been going on at all levels, including the European Union [EU] and the United States, to create grounds for peace and lasting stability within the framework of the new international order. Of course, the main issue in the whole process is the normalization of relations between Croatia and Serbia, or as they like to call it, Yugoslavia. Everyone is clear about it, and this is what my trip is all about.

It should be stressed here that from the very beginning Greece has been among the countries keen to contribute to the efforts to normalize the situation as soon as possible because of its links with Europe, etc. [end recording]

[Korda] On his visit to Greece, the president is being accompanied by Dr. Mate Granic, government chairman [as heard] and foreign minister; Dr. Ivan Simonovic, his deputy; and Dr. Zeljko Matic, the president's foreign policy adviser.

At Zagreb airport the president was seen off by Deputy Prime Minister Borisav Skegro; Interior Minister Ivan Jarnjak; Corps General Zvonimir Cervenko, chief of the Croatian Army's General Staff; and (Konstandinos Kakyushish), Greek charge d'affaires in Zagreb.

Croatia: Tudjman, Turkey's Demirel Discuss Bosnia

LD0608172196 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The president of the republic has had a conversation with Turkish President Suleyman Demirel in connection with problems related to breathing life into the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. The conversation, which took place at the request of Demirel, confirmed the two sides' full agreement that not only the problem of Mostar but also all other problems in the federation must be resolved in talks between the representatives of the Croat and Bosniak peoples, in keeping with the Washington and Dayton agreements.

Croatia: Tudjman Speech at Anniversary of Recapture of Knin

LD0508213696 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 5 Aug 96

[Speech by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman at military ceremony in Knin marking the first anniversary of the recapture of the town—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatian women and men, chivalrous members of the Croatian armed forces, the ground forces, the Croatian Air Force, the Croatian Navy, and the Croatian police force, dear youth of Croatia, dear citizens of Croatian Knin, ladies and gentlemen: The Day of State Gratitude—which we are celebrating for the first time this year—is indeed the day of all Croatian victories, but also the day when we must remember the long way the Croatian people have come from the Knin of [Croatian King] Zvonimir to the Knin we have today.

We must remind those who keep telling us that Croatia must get closer to Europe and meet some conditions to become a member of Europe, we must also remind some people in our midst, Croatian people and people in Europe and throughout the world that Croatia was in Europe 14 centuries ago. Between the 7th and 12th centuries Croatia had Croatian rulers, rulers from the people, princes and kings. [passage omitted]

We must acknowledge the merits of the Croats who opted for the antifascist movement in ensuring that the Croatian people found themselves on the side of antifascism in larger numbers than other peoples in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In the framework of the antifascist movement, the partisan warfare and the ZAVNOH [Croatia's World War II communist government] Croatia, the Croatian people created their army—bigger and stronger than other armies in Europe and Yugoslavia. But that is forgotten and you only hear about the Ustasha army and the home guard army which fought on the side of the NDH [Nazi puppet Independent State of Croatia]. They list that among our sins, but they forget the partisan army which was on the side of the Allies, of the democratic forces which have established the international order of today and are nowadays still dictating the terms of the European and world order.

That Croatian army—it was called the people's liberation army, the partisan army—was under a Croatian general staff. But when the NDH was taken to Bleiburg, that army was taken to Yugoslav military bases and after World War II the Croatian people were left disarmed.

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We later tried to alter laws and even the constitution to create a territorial army to give arms to the Croatian people again, to help them avoid having their rights denied in new fateful days. But until 1990 Croatia's communist leaders allowed themselves to be disarmed again, allowed Croatia's territorial army to be disarmed, allowed the Croatian people to be empty-handed at critical moments, at the time of the breakdown of communist rule in Europe and the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.

On that historic path—starting from the Knin of Zvonimir, which was a Croatian royal town, and, of course, a Croatian town—owing to the awareness of a majority of the Croatian people, we welcomed the 1990's with the proclamation of Croatian independence, but unarmed. We had to start from nothing, from privately owned arms, from pistols and rifles. We had to find a solution for creating a Croatian police force out of the former, anti-Croatian police force. I knew that despite the fact that Serbs from Knin held sway in the Croatian police force and on the Croatian political scene, there were Croats there who burned with the desire to start serving the Croatian people and the Croatian state. There were such people in the former Yugoslav army too.

So with a clever, wise policy we began creating our police force and our armed force. We were accused by Greater Serbian Belgrade and the Yugo-communist clique of creating a party army, an HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] army. We were even accused by some Croats of creating a party army, which is illegal.

Taught by our complex historic experience, we knew that we had to be sufficiently clever, wise, and shrewd and that we had to resort to all means to respond adequately to the lack of awareness among the Croats and to relations within Yugoslavia and in the world, the world which wanted to preserve the former Yugoslavia at any cost and wanted to see us defeated when the Yugo-communist army and Serbs unleashed all their might in the heart of Croatia against the Croatian state and Croatian freedom, at a time when Croatian freedom and democracy were still empty-handed and unarmed. In the autumn of 1991 when the Yugo-communist and Serbian aggression was in full swing, they even imposed a ban on selling arms to Croatia, an arms embargo. They knew that the Yugo-communist army was the fourth strongest military force in Europe and counted on us suffering a defeat, they thought that we—who rose, who stood up, who declared war for an independent, democratic, sovereign, and autonomous Croatian state—would not be able to defend ourselves, that we would be defeated.

I and my comrades-in-arms believed in the Croatian nation, we believed that with our policy of reconciliating the Croatia in the homeland and that in the diaspora, the policy of reconciling all Croatian classes, we could resist all powers. We believed that justice was on our side, as well as all historic aspirations and sacrifices the Croatian nation had made [sentence as heard]. We believed that with God's help we could succeed in doing what no one believed us capable of, no one except us who knew that the Croatian nation could resist and find strength even after they destroyed our Vukovar, even after the whole world wanted to see us defeated.

These are the days and circumstances that many people find easy to forget, as if it had happened centuries ago. It did not happen centuries ago, nor did it happen decades ago—it took place five to six years ago. One should remember everything that we have been through, what sacrifices we have made—these sacrifices were over ten times smaller than the sacrifices that the Croatian people made in World War II. The results that we have achieved are of historical importance. We have returned Zvonimir's Croatian town [Knin] to the fold of its motherland, Croatia, as pure as it was in Zvonimir's time.

After all the evil that befell the Croatian people and all the sacrifices that we made on both sides, a Croatian majority still existed in Knin, but it was gradually decreasing. Knin then became the center of everything that was anti-Croat, Knin ruled over Croatia, some kind of Serb republic was created in Knin which was supposed to rule over the entire Croatia, or to be a buttress for the conquest of Croatia from Virovitica, to Karlovac, to Karlobag—all this leading to the creation of a Serbia which would have access to three seas.

Dear Croatian brothers and sisters, that Serb republic enjoyed the support of Europe and the rest of the world. Just remember this: Only a year ago they were forcing us to accept the Z-4 plan [international plan for peaceful reintegration of Krajina in Croatia], to accept a Serb republic from Zadar and Knin stretching up to 28 km from Zagreb, with a Serb army, a Serb currency, a Serb president. They wanted it in order to prevent Croatia from becoming independent, or to force us to return to that wretched Yugoslavia from which we so painfully extracted ourselves.

A Croat should never forget this. And so, we had against us the Yugo-communist force, we had against us all the others in former Yugoslavia who wanted to remain in Yugoslavia and who wanted Croatia to remain so it would be better for the others. Only the Slovenians, who received permission and who left, thought, and even said: The Serbs have the right to live in one state.

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What did this mean to the Croat nation? A noose around its neck. Except this noose—the Serb republic of Krajina—they had developed a regional movement, a movement for the region of Istria so they could force us into a situation in which there is no life in a sovereign, independent Croatia.

Such were the conditions in which we fought for the establishment of an autonomous and sovereign, an independent and democratic Croatian state. These were the conditions in which these generations and all Croatian classes find themselves now, a renaissance that has not been achieved by any nation in Europe or the world.

The battle for such an autonomous, independent, and democratic Croatian state united the remains of the Croatian aristocracy, Croatian farmers and sailors, the peasants and workers and intelligentsia who arose from the people's ranks and who have the interests of the Croatian people in their thoughts.

The fact is that there were and still are renegades of the people, turncoats, Pharisees, hacks, those who do not know what the Croatian nation has been through to attain their freedom, those who cannot understand anything or those who can understand but cannot implement anything as they have no importance, have no capability, importance, or character, have no capabilities to come to the forefront of the Croatian people and to lead it in the battle for freedom, independence, and Croatian democracy, and not for some other democracy, a false one.

It is those who dare abuse Croatian freedom and democracy and who wrote, yesterday or the day before yesterday, that the president of Croatia did not meet the U.S. President—who had invited him and with whom he had talks lasting one and a half hours. They live in such Croatian freedom and democracy and still they dare to stand in front of the Croatian people who have achieved this freedom and this democracy.

The Croatian people will know what they achieved and at what price and will not allow the turncoats—and they have existed, as I have already said, during all times, among all nations, and in all movements. [passage omitted]

Along this road, the Croatian people matured into one of the most sensible, most capable nations that exist today, I dare to say this. [applause]

In spite of all the adverse conditions, we have set up our free Croatia, we defended it, created an armed force to the amazement of the world. [passage omitted]

We have created an armed force which is admired. They recognized that this armed force, with its victories, changed the strategic balance not only in the area of former Yugoslavia but in the whole region of southeast Europe.

Dear Croatian brothers and sisters, I have had neither the advice nor permission from European or world allies for any of the exploits in this war. They all tried to make me change my mind, they all said: You should not try to liberate Maslenica [bridge in then Serb-held Croatia], you should not proceed with Operation Flash [military operation in Western Slavonia], with Operation Storm [military operation in region of Krajina].

You should not proceed because the Serbs are so well armed that you cannot win. A myth about the invincible Serb army prevailed, a myth about the invincible Yugoslav army which in World War II tied down 30 fascist divisions. And after Operation Flash, which we concluded, to the wonder and amazement of the whole world, in two whole days, and after that Flash, and after our victories in the Knin hinterland and western Bosnia, after all this, they told me: If you proceed to Knin, the war will spread. It will be a universal catastrophe, you will be defeated.

Such were the conditions in which we came to Knin castle, in which we arrived on the train of freedom, from Zagreb via Karlovac and Knin, to Split. Such were the conditions in which the Croatian basketball team for the first time at the world Olympics yesterday won a gold medal [as heard], for the first time in Croatian history.

Dear Croatian brothers and sisters, all this should be known so that busybodies of all kinds, turncoats, or political dilettantes will not take us again up roads which could lead us to wastelands, Bleiburgs [site in Austria where anticommunist Yugoslavs were executed by the partisans after World War II], Belgrade, or who knows where. On the basis of everything we know and we have achieved, it is up to us to ensure Croatian freedom, Croatian democracy in the interests of every Croat, the Croatian nation, the Croatian state, and the future of the Croatian people.

It is understandable that we are facing huge tasks: we have to establish firm borders on the Danube; the Croatian Danubian region, with Baranja, eastern Slavonia, and western Srijem, has to be reintegrated into the constitutional and legal order of the Republic of Croatia.

If you want me to tell you the truth, the only concession that I agreed to make for my friends were two things: after our victories in Oluja and Bljesak [Croatian Army actions in which Serb Krajina was seized], after

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Knin, I agreed to check the Croatian Army which was advancing on Banja Luka [largest Bosnian Serb town]. We were only 23 km from Banja Luka and were capable of capturing it in a day or two. But then they would have told us that we were capturing Bosnia, that it was not Croatian territory. I also agreed, after I was given a promise by the international community and the top officials of the main world power, the United States, that they would ensure that the Croatian Danubian region would be returned peacefully to the constitutional and legal order of the Republic of Croatia. I agreed to it to prove that the Croats are not in favor of war, that war was imposed on us. We proved in the war that we are capable of winning unexpected victories, that we are capable of liberating the Croatian Danubian region. They said this would disturb their peacemaking efforts in a global context.

I knew that the liberation of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem would maybe cost us many more casualties than we suffered in the entire Homeland War. These were the reasons I embraced the peaceful option of reintegrating the currently occupied areas in Croatia. We did not make a mistake. Our refugees will go back to their homes a year later, but with fewer casualties and less destruction of other Croatian towns, and with strengthened relations between Croatia and world powers.

Of course, dear Croatian brothers and sisters, Croatia is weighed down with problems, but I wonder which state, which nation is free from social and other problems. This applies to even those states that have existed for centuries. They also have unemployment, social problems, urban and rural problems.

We can be proud that in addition to achieving a miracle in establishing the Croatian state and its armed forces, we have achieved a miracle in the sphere of the economy despite the war, despite half a million refugees from Croatia and slightly fewer refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina—throughout the war there were 200,000 of them, we are still looking after 180,000 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hundreds of thousands have crossed through Croatia.

Despite all these difficulties we have survived the war as if it had never happened. There were no shortages of important foodstuffs. Not only were there no shortages, we have even managed to create our state, our police, our army, our diplomacy—we have achieved what could hardly be achieved in peaceful conditions. We inherited unemployment and hyperinflation. In the midst of fighting, we introduced the national currency, the Kuna, curbed the inflation, and created a currency that has already earned a reputation in foreign financial circles.

Croatia is a country with one of the lowest inflation rates in the world, which provides the basis not only for the economic development of every Croatian individual, of every Croatian region, town, municipality, and Croatia as a whole, but also for trust in the Croatian economy which is based on private ownership and free entrepreneurship, in Europe and throughout the world. But this path is not strewn with roses. No nation has won its freedom without fighting and suffering casualties; no nation has achieved prosperity by leaping from poverty to wealth.

How rich we are going to be, how big our salaries are going to be, this will depend on all of us, on every Croatian man, on how much we are prepared to use our muscles, to use our brain. There is no reason to lose confidence. If we were capable of making our greatest, centuries-old dreams and goals come true, the dreams of Croatian freedom, Croatian democracy, of Croatia's place under the heavenly sun and in the world international order, then, my Croatian brothers and sisters, rest assured and trust both yourselves and us that we shall be able to resolve all the problems facing us and that our Croatia will be the most beautiful under the sun, both in the East and West, our Croatia from which Croatian people used to be banished but to which Croatian emigrants have already started to return. Tens of thousands have already returned. They fought as part of the Croatian army, they fought in the Croatian homeland war, and are now taking part in our economic reconstruction. One of our most important tasks is to bring them over so that they can find in their free homeland that which they went to seek and have only partially found in foreign countries. And foreign countries, even those that are rich and beautiful, are not more beautiful than our Croatia and cannot give the Croatian man and Croatian soul that which our Croatian sea, Croatian rocks, Croatian Slavonia, Croatian Podravina can.

You and I have experienced together the tears of joy of the Croatian people as they returned to their Croatian land. I saw a man, born at the back of beyond to Croatian parents, in New Zealand, the mayor of Wellington, when he saw our Croatian delegation, when he heard the Croatian anthem, he burst into tears although he had never been in Croatia. Our task is to make it possible for such people to return. It is our task to enable the Croatian people at home and all those who wish to return to join us in developing our Croatia into a country of prosperity, a country of freedoms that are in the interest of the Croatian people and the Croatian state and not of foreign domination.

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Never again should we allow lackeys and outcasts to sow the seeds of dissent among the Croatian people.

Dear Croatian brothers and sisters, in the last fews days, we have achieved a great victory on the international stage. As far back as last January, I held a meeting and said how they were planning to push us back into the Balkan confederation or union of southeastern Europe. Many political dilettantes in Croatia said then that I was making things up, that there was no danger.

Later I spoke with representatives of the EU and NATO who openly asked me to accept Croatia being a constituent part of the union of southeastern Europe—a part of the union where freedom of movement of people should be in force. Yes, from Pancevo and Pozarevac [towns in Serbia] to Knin; freedom of movement of goods, one telecommunications system, etc. Such a union would be worse for the Croatian people than the former Yugoslavia was.

Thanks to our decisive stand, we thwarted such plans with such a stand they have at least temporarily given up. Even two, three weeks ago, when the Croatian parliamentary delegation was in Strasbourg, they said they were offering 1 billion ECUs for the whole area of former Yugoslavia, except Slovenia, but with the addition of Albania. The others were more generous, and along with Albania, they were giving us also Bulgaria, Romania, and, of course, together with everything that was in former Yugoslavia.

In relation to such an attitude on the part of Europe and the world, thanks to our decisive stand, we have gotten the president of the main world power to say in public that he supports Croatia as a constituent part of central Europe and not of a Balkan, southeastern Europe.

I have even received a letter from the EU on behalf of European statesmen in which they agree that Croatia is part of central Europe. We achieved this because they had to face our determination and because they know that you, the Croatian armed forces and the majority of the nationally aware Croatian people which will never again allow itself to be deceived by anyone, are behind our determination.

This path from Zvonimir's Knin to the current Knin, the path of sacrifices which led to freedom, to today's ceremonies, to what the Croatian Air Force was capable of showing today and to what representatives of the Croatian authorities were able to see in the training center for Croatian noncommissioned officers in Sepurine—this path, which was covered in blood and the glory of our victories—this path is a firm indication to both the Croatian people and the international community that nothing, except divisions among ourselves, can discourage us from pursuing it.

Dear Croatian brothers and sisters, I appeal to you, in light of all this, not to forget, to go and study again Croatian history, which was hidden from you. You will see that learned Croats and Croatian intelligentsia realized a long time ago that we were not lagging behind Europe. During my negotiations and meetings with representatives of the main world superpower, the United States, we showed them a document that showed that the Croatian Republic of Dubrovnik had been among the first countries to recognize North America's independence.

I must remind both my diplomats and my intelligentsia that Croatia had the Croatian language, Croatian literature, and Croatian monuments long before many other nations. We had an ode to liberty before the French revolution and the American War of Independence. And Europe had 100-year and 30-year wars. And Europe and the European countries, which are given to us as examples to follow, do not recognize the existence of national minorities. And they are trying to lecture us! They say that those who write such fabrications and such lies, which I mentioned earlier, do not have rights in Croatia. Croatia had writers whose works were translated into major world languages long before Shakespeare and Moliere!

Croatia knew how to fight for its freedom and independence even during World War II—by fighting on both sides in order to ensure its future. At the critical time when the communist system was breaking down and when a new order was being established in Europe, Croatia made its contribution to the creation of the new order not just in former Yugoslavia, but also in this part of southeastern Europe.

So, dear Croatian brothers and sisters, we have foundations on which to build our history. We have things to be proud of, and let us safeguard what we have achieved. We should remember that our fate is in our hands.

Long live our one and only eternal Croatia!

Croatia: Tudjman Said To Resist Mostar 'Blackmail'

AU0708091596 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 4 Aug 96 p 4

[Commentary by Mario Marusic: "Nevertheless a Compromise in Mostar?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sanctions will be imposed on Croatia because of Mostar! Herzeg-Bosnia must disappear immediately or Zagreb will pay dearly for its

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"recklessness"! These are just some of the headlines that have been occupying the pages of the tabloid press over the last couple of days, in the expectation of the solution of the Mostar postelection crisis. The tabloids have openly backed the urgent need to "dismantle" the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats, without showing much interest in the general Croatian interests, which are undoubtedly reflected in the situation in which the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina find themselves regarding the (non)implementation of Dayton and the Federation project.

The truth, as usual, was rather far removed from those sensationalist articles, often ill-intentioned, but, as so many times before on similar occasions, when certain elements in the international community decided that the Croats had to be put under pressure once again, Mostar, as an ideal opportunity, was chosen as some kind of basic place for the Herzegovina Croats' tricks and, in line with that view, had to pay an expensive price for "the insane Herzegovina policy." [sentence as published]

Croatian Guilt on One's Head

The many pressures and much blackmail on the Croatian side over the last couple of days, particularly after the Brussels ultimatum, have stirred up the Croatian public so much that a genuine anti-Herzegovinian paranoia has broken out once again, in line with and intentionally heated up by Sarajevo and other centers of power not inclined toward the Croats. There is hardly anyone in Croatia who has not asked himself over recent days: What are the Croats in Mostar up to, why do they not agree to Cassado's decrees, even though they might be following in the steps of Koschnick, why do they not recognize the election results regardless of some "minor imperfections," and, finally, how long they will continue to behave so disobediently and thus inflict damage on the interests of the Croatian state?

Forced psychological pressure about (one more) "fault" of the Herzegovina Croats, of which there are anyway so many, has obviously fallen into fertile soil and the overall Croatian public have been wondering with great interest whether President Tudjman, under EU pressure, has given up protecting the Croatian nation and interests in Mostar. President Tudjman, at a VONS session [Council for Defense and National Security], as well as during an earlier meeting with Ejup Ganic (and how that meeting passed is well known), did not allow himself, as he had not on many occasions previously, to be drawn onto thin ice and to yield to pressures and blackmail, even though the threats exceeded not only the limits of diplomatic behavior, but also those of decent behavior. This was primarily because he is aware of the overall importance of the general Croatian interests as crystallized in Mostar and of the vital geostrategic position of the Herzegovinian territories in relation to southern Croatia.

On top of all that, Croatia has also decided to stand firm in protecting the interests of the Croatian people in Mostar because all the documents on the elections, that is on the irregularities, unquestionably supported the demands of the Mostar Croats. One cannot nitpick at their demands, even if the malicious and those who deliberately turn a blind eye can, because legally and formally everything is crystal clear.

Mostar Would Be Only the Beginning of the Story

To yield to blackmail at this moment in Mostar would mean not only the final departure of the Mostar Croats from the political stage and the beginning of their biological extinction, but, after a similar scenario, similar stories would probably ensue during the September elections in Stolac, Capljina, and Neum, let alone central Bosnia. For all that, we must ask ourselves one question: What would be the consequences for Croatia of such a possible outcome in Bosnia-Herzegovina? That is, does it pay at all to sacrifice at this stage even a little part of Croatian interests and demands in Mostar, if ultimately threatened with sanctions?

The effect of sanctions has always been dubious (if we take the worst case scenario), while, on the other hand, there is not the least doubt how dangerous it would be for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia to give in to the blackmail over Mostar. The Croatian side in Mostar, one must recall once again, despite all the formal and legal arguments on its side, has also decided this time to offer a new, compromise solution for the establishment of the Municipal Assembly.

Regarding the totally irregular elections in Bonn (a surplus of 26 ballot papers), the Croatian proposal is that, temporarily in the Municipal Assembly, there should be 16 Croats and 16 Muslims, without the five "others." According to the latest information available, this proposal was still being discussed by the European Administration (which also has not existed legally since 22 July). It will probably remain so until the last moment: 3 August at midnight, when the deadline for an agreement to overcome the legal vacuum in Mostar will expire and when Sir Martin Garrod, the nominated EU special envoy, has to decide on the acceptability of the Croatian offer, that is about the (staying or) departure of the EU from the town on the Neretva.

What is certain, however, is that the Croatian side will not give up its expressed stands, as has been confirmed in both Mostar and Zagreb. On the other hand, it is

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to be expected that the EU (not desiring its own defeat, among other things) will, nevertheless, stay on in Mostar (some indications of this have also been made by the United States with the visit of Assistant Secretary of State John Kornblum), which means that a compromise could, nevertheless, be reached, as so many times in Mostar, at the 11th hour and the postelection crisis overcome.

Croatia: Butrus-Ghali Proposes To Extend UNTAES Mandate

AU0708104896 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0735 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] New York, 7 August (BETA)—UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali recommended that the UN operation in eastern Slavonia be extended until the end of 1997 before the region's complete reintegration with Croatia.

The existing UN mission mandate, which is headed by retired U.S. General Jacques Klein, will expire on 15 January 1997.

Croatia is opposed to the extension of the UN mandate beyond the expiration date, maintaining that the Serb population in the region seeks autonomy to which Zagreb would not agree.

In the report submitted to the UN Security Council last night, Butrus-Ghali emphasized that "in light of the present circumstances in the region it is not realistic to expect that UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] tasks will be realized before the present mandate expires (on 15 January)."

The tasks to which he refers include interethnic reconciliation, economic recovery, the establishment of the rule of law, housing construction, and the holding of the local elections, as envisaged by UN Security Council resolutions. "The way things stand at the moment," Butrus-Ghali said, "it can easily happen that the political games continue and that the entire reintegration process comes under threat. For that reason the UN Security Council should examine the possibility of extending the UNTAES mandate for a period of no longer than 12 months to fulfill all the tasks set."

The most pressing UNTAES's problem is a shortage of funds, bearing in mind that Croatia failed to come up with the $10 million, which it should have provided.

Butrus-Ghali emphasized that if Croatia failed to secure the funds in the foreseeable time, he would be compelled to inform the UN Security Council that Zagreb had not fulfilled its obligations undertaken by the Dayton accord.

Klein believed that Croatia would be able to provide the money thanks to the exploitation of oil wells in eastern Slavonia, and also that the oil industry would create employment possibilities in the region.

Zagreb, however, reported that it lacked the sufficient funds to clear the mines in the area surrounding the wells.

The report by the UN secretary general draws attention "to a certain increase in lawlessness in the region as well as an unhindered existence of criminals and also to the fact that UNTAES failed to convince the local population to license personal firearms."

Croatia: UNHCR Accuses Croatia of Blocking Return of Refugees

AU0608134896 Paris AFP in English 1334 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Aug 6 (AFP)—The UN refugee agency criticised Croatia on Tuesday for stemming the return of Serb refugees and allowing those who did come back to be harassed and intimidated.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) spokesman Ron Redmond said it was a "very, very sad situation" which sent a "clear signal to refugees" not to go back.

He said the situation had changed little since Operation Storm, a lightening Croatian army offensive against separatist Serbs in the Krajina region in August last year.

Some 175,000 Serb refugees fled to rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) following the offensive, while 10,000 remained, but "only a handful have gone back," Redmond added.

"There are several reasons for this: lack of interest and cooperation by the Croatian authorities, mass destruction (of homes) and also intimidation and harassment of the some 10,000 remaining Croatian Serbs.

"From the very beginning we were receiving reports of atrocities, burning, looting. It has been going on ever since Operation Storm began."

People feared being arrested if they returned, and authorities in Zagreb at present were only allowing family reunions, Redmond said.

The UNHCR and International Committee of the Red Cross have set up a scheme to identify Serbs who have relatives still in Krajina. Around 1,100 Serbs said they wanted to return, but nothing has happened so far.

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For the refugees still in federal Yugoslavia, "this is a very, very bleak outlook. They feel like second class citizens.

"The Croats themselves said 8,000 have already gone back, but we have no idea who these people are, and where they went, nor does anyone else."

To make matters worse, he added, citing Croatian authorities, 50,000 Croats and Bosnian Croats had moved into the former Serb zone in late May.

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FYROM: Foreign Ministry Hiring Personnel From Among Minorities

AU0708064596 Skopje MIC in English 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] According to reliable sources from Macedonian Foreign Ministry, NOVA MAKEDONIJA finds out that out of the 36 new employees in the Macedonian Foreign Ministry 13 are recruited from the ranks of the national minorities. After the last wave of appointments, when Muhamed Halili and Servet Avziu were appointed ambassadors to Denmark and Croatia, and Estref Aliu was appointed Ambassador in the Macedonian Foreign Ministry, it can be concluded that the national "key" finally got started in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. NOVA MAKEDONIJA comments that this is the way to respond to the remarks of the minorities, claiming that they are deprived of their rights. These claims are contained in the reports of the Council of Europe and other international organizations.

In addition, Macedonian Foreign Ministry has insisted on many occasions that expansion of the diplomatic service cannot be used as an experiment, and that its straightening will be mainly determined by the level of education and the abilities of its employees, says NOVA MAKEDONIJA in its today's issue.

FYROM: Albanian Press Protests 'Ethnic Discrimination'

AU0108163996 Tirana ALBANIA in Albanian 1 Aug 96 p 1

[Unattributed editorial: "The Macedonian State, With the Consensus of the Albanians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When some of the strongest European countries, of course including the United States, reached a consensus more than three years ago to "create" the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] state with all the variants of its formal name, it was beyond all doubt that this state could not be founded much less survive without the consensus of the Albanians in Macedonia. This was not so much because of the number (42 percent of all the FYROM's citizens are Albanians, regardless of the mistakes in counting the Macedonian administration prefers to make), as because of their weight. A realistic analysis of relations between a nation and a state (a closed chapter for Europeans) shows that the absence or forced exclusion of the Albanians would turn the new state of Macedonia into a fiction. It is true to say that, despite the absence of written agreements, the Macedonians themselves were not thinking of excluding the Albanians when the Western powers offered their consensus to build the Macedonian state. The aim of the great determination of the Europeans and the United States was first of all to prevent a possible and very dangerous explosion in this part of the Balkans. A new hotbed of conflict in Macedonia would conceivably involve many others in the Balkans, some of whom (not including the Albanians and especially not Albania), continued to nurse plans for the partition of Macedonia.

During the last three years, the Albanians in the FYROM have demonstrated their will to live together in a state not only because it is the sole alternative for the Macedonian state, but because it is also the only alternative for their own progress and for peace in the region. Albania, as a neighboring country highly interested in consolidating the stability of the Macedonian state, adopted toward it an open policy of good-neighborliness when other Balkan countries were following Cold War scenarios.

Three years have passed since the consensus of the Western powers including the United States, but inevitably also including the Albanians. Despite the Albanians' consistent efforts to maintain the consensus of togetherness and stability in a common state, we have unfortunately seen that the Macedonian state hangs by a thread and, as a result, so do peace and stability.

The Macedonian administration has responded to the Albanians' fair demands for a university with violence and by imprisoning the rector of the University of Tetovo. In fact, this administration should be of the Albanians and Macedonians together, not just of the Macedonians alone, and as such it cannot in any case last long. This is no doubt an extreme abuse of the consensus of the Albanians in the FYROM. The Macedonian administration is seriously jeopardizing the existence of the newly created state. There is no question of any debate on whether the Albanians have the right to schools or not. Any debate on terms of this kind undermines the very existence of the Macedonian state. The doors of the Universities of Skopje and Bitola have been closed to Albanians. The figure of 1.7 percent of Albanian students at these two universities exposes the Macedonian authorities and is a clear evidence of a policy of ethnic discrimination against the Albanians. This is all the more serious when it is applied in such an important field as the right to education. The violence and the imprisonment of the university rector and other activists are exacerbating the interethnic climate in the FYROM. This is a dangerous precedent. Tomorrow will be too late, and not only for the existence of a Macedonian state.

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FYROM: Albanians Rally in Support of Tetovo University

AU0308205896 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1730 GMT 3 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A big popular rally was held in Kercove today to support Tetovo University and demand the release from prison of the university activists. For more, here is a telephone report by our correspondent Imer Ismajli:

[Ismajli] Opening this rally, in which several thousand Albanian citizens took part, the publicist Qani Mehmedi said that we have gathered here at a time when, in a special statement, the Albanian Parliament strongly supported the right of Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] to higher education.

Representatives of the Rector Office and Senate of Tetovo University, Dr. Rahmi Tuda and Dr. Qemal Murati, briefed the people at the protest rally on the current course of the Tetovo University following the imprisonment of Rector Fadil Sulejmani and other activists.

Meanwhile, on behalf of the Association of Albanian Writers of Macedonia, the association vice chairman, Magistrate Ramadan Sinani, stated that the creative intelligentsia in Macedonia cannot imagine the existence of this nation without Tetovo University, thus the association will continue to powerfully support it.

From the protest rally, an appeal was sent to the international centers to influence in legalizing the Tetovo University.

It is interesting that all the Kercove citizens took part at the rally without considering their partial pertinence [words indistinct] in defense of Tetovo University, as the university is a national and not a political institution. This was the biggest rally by Albanians in the history of the city.

FYROM: PDPA Member on Rival Party, Tetovo School

AU0508183596 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 3-4 Aug 96 pp 4-5

[Interview with Rufi Osmani, PDPA member of parliament, by Sonja Kramarksa; place and date not given: "I Am Not Returning to Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Rufi Osmani is perhaps one of the rare Albanian politicians who has been positively praised even by the Macedonian audience in the two years of this parliament's work. He is an equally good connoisseur of economy and policy, a talented intellectual. Recently, Rufi Osmani gave taciturn support to the radical policy that is advocated by his party, PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians]. With respect to his party's decision, Osmani decided to receive his salary as a member of parliament, but not to act as a member of parliament, at least as long as the conflict between PDPA-NDP [People's Democratic Party] and the authorities in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is unresolved. At the same time, he has exchanged his bench in parliament for a place at the meetings that were held in support of the leaders of the Tetovo para-university.

Radical Change

[Kramarska] You have resigned from the post of member of parliament, but you have not resigned from your salaries.

[Osmani] We have not resigned from the salaries because the people that we represent are paying taxes to the state, and therefore we will be using this compensation as long as we find it appropriate.

[Kramarska] The parliament's Rule Book tolerates an absence up to six months. After this period, your mandates will probably end....

[Osmani] This is our second abstinence from parliament, and I am deeply convinced that it is going to be the last. I personally will not return to parliament because it is an institution in which all the Albanian mischief in Macedonia is generated.

[Kramarska] So far you have been famous for your discussions on the economy. When all the events connected with the parauniversity occurred, you gave taciturn support to the radical policy that is conducted by your party....

[Osmani] This conclusion does not correspond to reality. Since the outset, I have always backed the policy of my party and the university.

[Kramarska] So, this means it is not true that you are a moderate among the radicals.

[Osmani] I think that not only I, but all the Albanians in Macedonia in general are moderate. I just belong to a political party that pledges radical change in events, with respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Macedonia, with respect for the form of Macedonia, but also for a new Macedonia that will be constitutionally rearranged in agreement with the two largest populations that live in it: Macedonian and Albanian.

[Kramarska] Speaking about respect for the form of Macedonia, do you consider it as such when the Al-

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banian national flag is hoisted at the meetings in which you regularly participated in July, without hoisting the flag of the state whose form you respect?

[Osmani] There was not an Albanian flag on the official floor! Albanian flags were carried by the participants at the meetings. Once and for all, we must realize that the Albanian flag is the national flag of all Albanians, no matter where they live.

[Kramarska] Tell us who ordered the singing of the Albanian anthem at these meetings?

[Osmani] The answer is the same as the one before: It is the anthem of the Albanian nation, no matter where they live. There is nothing Albanian—that is, the culture, history, and tradition of the Albanians—in the Macedonian anthem. If we want the Macedonian anthem to be accepted by all, it has to be an expression of the aspirations of all the citizens in Macedonia.

[Kramarska] However, the Macedonian nation was called "Slav-Macedonian" at the meetings in which you also participated.

[Osmani] Those who call the Macedonians Slav-Macedonians are probably referring to some scientific arguments in conformity with the general truth that the present Macedonians have a Slavic origin. I personally believe it is the legitimate right of each nation to call itself as it pleases or feels, which means that the Macedonians for me are Macedonians.

What Kind of Education?

[Kramarska] How does PDPA intend to solve the problem of a militant current in its ranks which is apparently active?

[Osmani] There is no such thing! The PDPA is conducted by moderate politicians with a clear vision for opposition to the present political team that is not offering anything good to the Albanians. It is not true that a militant current is becoming stronger in the PDPA, because we are accomplishing our policy by peaceful means.

[Kramarska] Mr.Osmani, considering the events, who is the leader of the Albanians in Macedonia: Abdurahman Aliti, Arben Dzaferi, or Fadil Sulejmani?

[Osmani] Arben Dzaferi is the leader of the PDPA, education is headed by Fadil Sulejmani, while the first gentleman is just the leader of a smaller group that is infiltrated [by the government] in power and which does not have political legitimacy among the Albanians in Macedonia.

[Kramarska] There were many alleged students of the parauniversity at the meetings. So, is there a scientific or a political education in Mala Recica [where the university is located]?

[Osmani] It is natural for the students whose university is forbidden by the government from participating at meetings that are protesting against such an order. I claim that education is scientific, and not political.

[Kramarska] Would you as a competent and ambitious economist care to be educated in Mala Recica?

[Osmani] I am now doing my postgraduate studies at the University in Tirana. If there are such studies in Tetovo, why not!

[Kramarska] Tell us something more about the differences between the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] and the PDPA; there are probably many reasons, but the causal factor was the events connected with the parauniversity.

[Osmani] The people in the PDP have dissociated themselves from the Albanian projects in Macedonia. They demolished the common Party for Democratic Prosperity, and now they are trying to do the same with Tetovo University. However, this time they will not succeed. They are offering information that the leaders of the university are abusing the money. There was such a text even in your newspaper, but it does not have anything to do with the truth, and the university authorities will soon prove how false these data are. There is documentation for all money flowing into Tetovo University, and the money is used in accordance with the norm and acts of the university. Aliti's party is the one that is doing the greatest sabotage in the financing of the university by the Albanians in Macedonia and those living abroad. The PDP tried to use Sefedin Haruni, who was discharged by the Senate of Tetovo University, to stage a coup and to replace Fadil Sulejmani. This directed coup could only end with the PDP's political suicide.

FYROM: Anniversary of Ilinden Uprising Celebrated

AU0508173596 Skopje MIC in English 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The great meeting which was held in the locality of Meckin Kamen in the vicinity of Krusevo, attended by several thousands of citizens, marked the 93 Anniversary of the Ilinden Uprising and the Krusevo Republic.

At the meeting, Macedonian Assembly Chairman Tito Petkovski addressed the people, emphasizing among the rest that the Krusevo Republic, which was the first republic in the Balkans, "was the first independent Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of

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Macedonia—FYROM] state which gave an outlet to the sovereign rights of the Macedonian people."

Tito Petkovski also said that "the ones who deny the Macedonian past and history can easily wipe out all the events that happened after 1941, but in case they have only a bit of virtue, they will have to admit that this state of ours, is neither out of the blue, nor somebody gave it to us."

Petkovski also mentioned the Referendum on Independence, held on 8 September 1991, and the adoption of the Macedonian Constitution on 17 November 1991, noting that the Preamble of the Constitution especially emphasizes the state-legal tradition of the Krusevo Republic, the historic decisions of ASNOM [Antifascist Assembly of the People's Liberation of Macedonia], the constitutional-legal continuity of the Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign Republic in the framework of the former Yugoslav Federation, and the Referendum held on 8 September 1991.

Summarizing the last five years, Petkovski said that very few sovereign countries in the world have been faced with such difficult problems, pressures and obstructions in relation to Macedonia's membership in the international organizations. "There were, and there still are, irrational accusations that this small country has aggressive territorial pretensions towards far more powerful neighbors, that it adopts foreign symbols, and as culmination of these absurds, was the demand that Macedonia changes its name," said Petkovski.

In relation to the minorities, Petkovski said that they have always been together with the Macedonians, in good or bad. "The extremists who make an unprecedented pressure and they blackmail the Macedonian people and the Macedonian state, are in fact trying to turn Macedonia into a simple sum of communities," Petkovski emphasized.

There were also other manifestations in Krusevo, held on the occasion of the Krusevo Republic.

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Poland: Deputy Defense Minister on Restructuring

WS0608120096 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 5 Aug 96 pp 1-2

[Interview with Andrzej Karkoszka, Polish secretary of state and first national defense deputy minister, by Andrzej Medykowski; place and date not given: "Army for Tomorrow, Troubles for Today..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Medykowski] The process of restructuring the ministry is under way. What are the goals of this undertaking?

[Karkoszka] The primary goal is to rationalize the structures and to create possibilities of managing the ministry well. An important goal is also reducing the costs of running the ministry.

We are planning to reduce the number of full-time jobs by 15 percent. Soon we will begin work to determine the concrete structures of departments and directorates. Drafts of these structures should be ready early in the spring.

Also, work is under way to organize the Command Headquarters of the Ground Forces. However, it is too early to speak about specifics now because decisions, including appointments, will be made at a later time.

[Medykowski] An important goal of the reform is to concentrate the structures and assign them specific tasks. However, won't it turn out soon that in some areas the number of tasks is increasing? Will the structures expand as a result?

[Karkoszka] It is no secret that there will be more tasks related to the implementation of international agreements. This particularly goes for the disarmament process, such as the Document of Vienna on the means of creating trust and security, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and others. This creates the need to receive and carry out inspections. Moreover, it is possible that the convention to ban chemical weapons may be put into effect, as a result of which it will be necessary to carry out appropriate inspection operations.

Thus, it is advisable to think about strengthening the team of inspectors, which is rather small and very overworked.

[Medykowski] There is not enough money for the Armed Forces, and it is necessary to limit expenditures. How will the military's money be spent?

[Karkoszka] Because the budget is small, it is necessary to rationalize expenditures, but, at the same time, one should predict the economic and social consequences of the reforms.

For this reason, an apparatus will be set up that will carry out studies to see to it that no subjective decisions are made. This is because there were cases in the past where such decisions caused bad results.

[Medykowski] A large portion of the small budget of the Armed Forces will be earmarked for the maintenance of the military. Meanwhile, hardware is aging very quickly. What is the ministry going to do about that?

[Karkoszka] First of all, it is indispensable to rationalize the system of purchasing arms and equipment for the Armed Forces. This will enable us to avoid trouble, especially when it comes to foreign partners.

An equally important issue is selection of an appropriate defense option. One needs to think about which structures will best meet our defense needs.

Then we will have to decide what equipment we should purchase: tanks or assault helicopters, antitank missiles or smart ammunition. We will have to think about whether to enlarge the infrastructure or to invest in transportation. Moreover, if Poland is admitted to NATO, the following question will arise: To what extent should we strengthen our defense system on our own, and to what extent should we do this together with the alliance?

Over the next few weeks, we must draw up a draft of the main principles of the law on Armed Forces development. It should deal with such areas as the tasks, defense capabilities, and structures of our Armed Forces, as well as their training and financing over the next five years.

I would like to add that the ministry will be carrying out simulations that will cover a 15-year period.

[Medykowski] What are the main principles?

[Karkoszka] First of all, the striving to increase the share of the ministry's expenditures on modernization from less than 9 percent to more than 10 or even to 25-30 percent. However, this is extremely difficult to accomplish....

[Medykowski] Why? After all, politicians and parliament members show a lot of sympathy for the Armed Forces and declare support for issues related to the state's defense....

[Karkoszka] If we asked them about it, every politician and parliament member would most certainly say that he is all for strong, efficient, well-equipped, and well-paid Armed Forces. However, the Armed Forces do not make money; they spend it. They live on their budget, so everyone is watching our hands. Now, after all, there

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are other important sectors that compete to get more money from the budget: the health service, education.

[Medykowski] So politicians' sympathies and reality are two different things. Who is to blame?

[Karkoszka] Because you asked the question in this way, I will answer bluntly: We are all to blame.

The idea of holding a conference of politicians on the shape of the Armed Forces and on the satisfaction of their needs has not been put into effect. If they agreed that it is necessary to intensify training, speed up the process of repairing equipment, and improve soldiers' living standards, they accordingly should make the government prepare an appropriate budget and make the parliament adopt it.

[Medykowski] Is there no solution to that problem?

[Karkoszka] As the gross domestic product grows, expenditures on modernization should increase as well; we believe that they should increase 3 percent faster than the ministry's budget. Now, if we add more economy measures and if our attempts prove successful, over five years the share of expenditures on modernization might reach 17 percent.

This may be achieved through a variety of measures, such as reducing the infrastructure, the number of garrisons, and perhaps the number of soldiers. However, this is a very difficult problem because it concerns people's jobs.

We cannot count on a bigger budget in the near future. For this reason, it is necessary to rationalize expenditures; wherever possible, certain functions will be fulfilled by civilian people—for example, guards, workshop employees, financial services.

A good example of measures that are being taken in this area is the management of airspace, where we are implementing a U.S. initiative, the so-called Warsaw initiative. As a result, military personnel will be reduced in favor of civilian employees; of course, the civilians will be appropriately trained and prepared so that they will know how to act in crises.

[Medykowski] But we have to think about integration with NATO.

[Karkoszka] This is a significant argument because we must meet certain commitments.

[Medykowski] Perhaps others will help us. Perhaps we will see more signs that integration with NATO will be easier. Recently, the U.S. Congress made it possible for the President to earmark specific sums of money for aid for such countries as Poland.

[Karkoszka] In the Congress we have seen a breakthrough that may be of help to us: the lobby supporting NATO expansion has become stronger and obtained backing from the White House.

Conditions have been created to grant aid to the Central European countries that want to join NATO, such as Poland.

[Medykowski] In many regions of the world, the nature of the tasks given to armed forces is changing; this is because the threats are also changing. What about our Armed Forces? Will they also be changing because of that?

[Karkoszka] It is a fact that the tasks of armed forces are changing; however, I am not sure that this phenomenon should be looked at so one-sidedly. Although armed forces are more and more often used to keep peace and to take preventive measures, it must be remembered that these are purely military functions: a military presence in a certain area, and sometimes performing concrete operations.

As long as a certain crisis situation does not pose a threat to the security of the state, armed forces should not be used. However, if it came to a crisis, they certainly might be brought into action.

[Medykowski] We live in peaceful times, and politicians offer assurances that there are no threats. Consequently, they skimp on the armed forces...

[Karkoszka] Armed forces cannot be established over a year, two years, or even five years. Today things are quiet, but it cannot be ruled out that certain threats will appear in 10, 15, or 20 years. The education of officers, the training of pilots—it all takes years. It requires a complex infrastructure and, consequently, considerable investments.

The task of politicians is to predict possible threats and prepare the country's Armed Forces for any contingency—many years ahead.

[Medykowski] Thank you for the interview.

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Romania: Official Contests Iliescu's Right To Run for President

AU0608155796 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 2 Aug 96 pp 1, 3

[Article by Andreea Munteanu: "Is Iliescu Running for a Fourth Term?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the division of the post-December era suggested by Ion Iliescu himself, "a first term as head of the state runs between 22 December 1989 and 20 May 1990, a second one between June 1990 and October 1992, and a third one between October 1992 and October 1996." The conclusion one inevitably draws from this is that on 3 November the current president of the country is running for a fourth term, Radu Berceanu, vice president of the Chamber of Deputies [and secretary of the Democratic Party's Permanent Bureau], said during a news briefing. He based his assertion on documents currently being kept in the archives. On 22 December 1989, a CFSN [National Salvation Front Council] communique personally read out by Iliescu clearly emphasized the need that "all political leaders of the country should be elected for one single or, at the very most, two terms."

As Berceanu pointed out, the author of the book titled *Revolution and Reform* [Iliescu], while quoting the 10 objectives formulated in the communique addressed to the nation, forgets to mention precisely this half-rentence referring to the number of possible terms. This stipulation became law on 27 December 1989, when it was included in the first law decree issued by the CFSN. In 1990 they passed the Electoral Bill, on whose basis they then organized the elections, which were won by Iliescu, who thus became the president of the country. One year later he promulgated the Constitution, which allows for "any incumbent president to run for only one further term at the most, even if successively." At the time the Constitution was promulgated, Iliescu was in the middle of his first presidential term. It results that he only had the right to run once more, which he actually did in September 1992. Therefore now it is high time for him to stop!

He cannot invoke the principle of Roman law forbidding laws to be applied retroactively, because, as Berceanu put it, the sense of that constitutional stipulation is absolutely clear: "During one person's lifetime, if all other prerequisites are met, that person cannot act as Romania's president for more than two terms, that is for longer than eight years." Supposing that he wins this year's elections as well, which we do not wish upon ourselves, "Ion Iliescu would accumulate 10 years of acting as leader of the state, unless he is unable to do so owing to objective or natural reasons, which are beyond his control."

Considering all this, Radu Berceanu suggested to Mr. Iliescu that he should take "the moral, correct, legal, and constitutional stance and use his well known coercive methods to have the Constitution amended, so that candidates would be allowed to run for three terms or innumerable terms, or even be elected president for life!"

Romania: PDSR Chided for Trying To Co-Opt Senior Ministers

AU0608141396 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 2 Aug 96 p 1

[Editorial by Dumitru Tinu: "Too High a Price"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Regardless of whether or not Mr. Nastase [executive president of the Social Democracy Party of Romania, PDSR] likes it, President Ion Iliescu is putting together his electoral team by circumventing the PDSR. A simple enumeration of those being considered to run his electoral campaign is quite revealing and indicates the president's desire to present himself in a select company, by ridding himself of those who have spoiled his image. Therefore, he is surrounding himself with people such as Teodor Melescanu [minister of foreign affairs], Theodor Stolojan [former prime minister], Academician Tudorel Postolache, Mugur Isarescu [president of the National Bank of Romania], Iosif Boda [presidential aide], and others. All of them look good: elegant, intelligent, sober, and charismatic. In order to better understand the difference, let us just imagine for a moment the president in the company of such PDSR leaders as Gherman [PDSR president], Solcanu [PDSR vice president], Vacaru [PDSR secretary], Dumitrascu [PDSR senator], or Mischie [PDSR deputy]. You feel like shuddering!

There is no need to speculate further on what Mr. Iliescu wanted to say when he only confined himself to accepting the PDSR's offer of support in the presidential campaign, without stating that he will be running on behalf or on the list of the party with the three roses [the PDSR emblem]. Aware of the collapse of the ruling party's credibility, he wants to show that he has nothing in common with those involved in all kinds of dubious affairs, who are quoted in the reports of Parliament's commissions of inquiry, or those of the Court of Public Accounts, or the Magistracy as "protagonists" in various corruption scandals. The simple association with the PDSR's name has become compromising. Hence, the desperation with which the PDSR executive president is laying claim to Mr. Iliescu. He must be "ours" or "he is the PDSR's candidate, since the party is collecting

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signatures for him," Adrian Nastase insists, more to convince himself than anyone else.

It was in such a moment of panic that Mr. Nastase got the idea of touching up the party's battered image by enlisting the support of prominent figures who, in his opinion, might halt the slide. If Mr. Iliescu wants to have his picture taken with Teodor Melescanu, why should the latter not appear in that photo as a new PDSR member? He could kill two birds with one stone, one for the Cotroceni [presidential palace] and the other for the PDSR; this is the reasoning of the man who, aside from the presidency of the ruling party and other presidencies, is also the chairman of the Association of Sports Hunters. From a mere suggestion to an ultimatum and blackmail was only one step, which Adrian Nastase did not hesitate to make, by reminding Melescanu that it was he who had suggested and nominated him at the time as foreign minister, despite the opposition of Petre Roman [the then prime minister]. There is another man whom Mr. Nastase would like to have next to him with the PDSR seal on his forehead, namely, Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca. Such a preference is no mere accident. Since the charismatic diplomat is at the head of the ministry, the Romanian Army has constantly been, according to the opinion polls, in first place in the people's trust. With his calm but firm voice, Minister Tinca has pleasantly surprised those who listened to his arguments on television or read his interviews with the press at home and abroad for daring to warn the West against the error of leaving Romania outside the NATO integration process.

Mr. Nastase's calculation is quite simple: Having these two ministers on either side and confiscating their quota of public sympathy, he may hope for a miracle. But is such a thing still possible? Even if the enlistment of these two ministers might mend something here and there within the PDSR, is it really worth it?

The implications of such a possible permutation are both of a personal and of a far-reaching nature, even touching on the national interest. At first glance, one can say that it is up to Messrs. Tinca and Melescanu to decide whether they want to waste the capital of respectability that they have gained in their long diplomatic career on the PDSR's roulette. On the other hand, both of them are engaged in a decisive battle for Romania's integration into the euro-atlantic structures. How can a party's electoral interests take precedence over the national interest? Some two or three years ago, Mr. Melescanu was quite categorical in this respect, when he rejected the suggestion of his former chief at the Foreign Ministry to join the PDSR. Even President Iliescu intervened at the time, saying that a nonparty member is preferable for the Foreign Ministry portfolio, since international policy is not party policy, but rather the result of a consensus of all the country's responsible political forces. What are the arguments or proof with which the PDSR president is now squeezing Mr. Melescanu, to have the latter seeming to waver in his convictions?

In order better to understand the consequences of the possible enrolment of the two ministers, let us recall the recent debate in the U.S. Congress on the issue of most-favored-nation [MFN] status for Romania. As is known, the controversy did not converge only on granting it or not on a permanent basis, but rather the moment chosen for making this decision. The only argument invoked by the initiators of the resolution to postpone this law was that the granting of the clause might be used for electoral purposes for the benefit of the president and the ruling party. It is not hard to imagine that the move of two key cabinet ministers, Tinca and Melescanu, lock, stock, and barrel to the PDSR—two ministers known and appreciated in Western political and diplomatic circles—would substantially diminish the value of the Romanian effort for NATO integration at a decisive moment, namely the naming, at the end of this year, of the first countries to join the North Atlantic alliance. Who is ready to take on such a responsibility?

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Federal

FRY: Athens Talks To Close Without News Conference

AU0708101196 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0735 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Athens, 7 August (BETA)—The presidents of Serbia and Croatia, Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, will today discuss the further normalization of relations between Belgrade and Zagreb.

We have learned unofficially that the beginning of the Milosevic-Tudjman talks was pushed forward from 1000 local time (0900 Central European Time) to 1100 hours because the Croatian president is arriving in Athens today. Milosevic has been vacationing in Greece for several days "as a guest of a Greek shipping magnate," it has been learned.

From diplomatic circles close to the participants, BETA was informed that the meeting is scheduled to end early in the afternoon. The two presidents will first have a 30-minute meeting with the initiator of the meeting, Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Simitis. The Milosevic-Tudjman meeting will proceed one-on-one, with the participation of the delegations, which include FRY and Croatian Foreign Ministers Milan Milutinovic and Mate Granic, respectively.

It is envisaged that the two delegations will have lunch together with Simitis, Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, and their aides.

This will conclude the meeting that is being held in the luxury hotel resort Astera in the Athenian coastal quarter of Vouliagmeni.

The initial plan does not envisage a joint news conference by Milosevic and Tudjman, while an agreement on the possible issue of a statement is yet to be reached. The three sides agreed that access to the participants of the talks be only allowed to representatives of the state media from FRY, Greece, and Croatia. Officials of each of the three sides will give statements to the state radio-television and news agency of the respective country.

The least is known about the actual topics of the Milosevic-Tudjman talks. On the condition of remaining anonymous, a foreign diplomat said that "he expects the biggest step in the direction of mutual recognition between Croatia and FRY so far will be made." He did not specify which "step" that would be, however, he did not rule out the possibility of progress in connection with the issue of Prevlaka.

Greek sources mentioned as meeting topics the rights of Serbs who were expelled from Krajina last year, the status of eastern Slavonia, as well as the issue of Yugoslavia's continuity. [passage omitted]

FRY: Over 100,000 Refugees Register for B-H Elections

AU0608162896 Paris AFP in English 1613 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 6 (AFP)—More than 100,000 Bosnian refugees living in rump Yugoslavia have registered to vote in Bosnia's first post-war general elections next month, an official with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) said Tuesday [6 August].

Jean-Pierre Kleiner said that a third of the refugees opted to vote for candidate lists in their area of origin.

Those voters, mostly Moslems who fled areas in Bosnia under Croat control, will be able to cast their ballots in polling stations in Serbia and Montenegro.

The majority of the refugees are Serbs, who plan to vote in the Serb entity in Bosnia, the Republika Srpska, in the area where they plan to live.

Kleiner said that the registration procedure had gone reasonably well and added that a representative from the OSCE, which is in charge of organizing and supervising the September 14 elections, will be stationed at each polling station.

"Only a few isolated cases of intimidation against the refugees were reported," he said.

The Belgrade office of the Helsinki Committee on Human Rights had earlier said that Bosnian refugees had been pressured to ask to vote under a scheme where they would cast their ballot in the region where they plan to later settle.

An estimated 215,000 refugees live in the rump Yugoslavia.

FRY: Central Bank Achieves 'First Positive Results'

LD0508152096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1509 GMT 5 Aug 96

["Central Bank Has Yielded First Positive Results"—TANJUG headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug. 5 (TANJUG)—The latest measures of the Yugoslav National Bank (NBJ) to improve solvency in the economy have yielded positive results, the secretary-general of the Association of the Banks of Yugoslavia has said.

In an interview to TANJUG's ECONOMIC SIGNALS monthly, Mileta Babovic said the central bank had

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reached a decision to buy off claims for the planned exports through letters of credit from a renowned foreign bank.

He said the measure was conducive to firms that already had exports contracts, as they would be receiving funds in dinars in advance, on the basis of the letter of cedit.

Babovic said some banks had secured credit lines abroad but added that the amount was not sufficient.

He said the economy needed circulating assets, but added that banks could not handle bigger investments at present.

The economy and banking system were part of a vicious circle, he said, adding that money supply could increase only if production rose, and production needed fresh investment.

Babovic said the banks were running into debts to maintain daily solvency, thus debts to the central bank have reached about 200 million dinars (60.0 million DM). They have also borrowed funds from financial markets.

On the other hand, he said, banks were claiming about 1.3 billion dinars (394 million DM).

New tax regulations, he said, should not increase taxes on interest as that would trigger a hike, which would affect costs of production and prices.

Babovic said a minor drop in interest was observed in June and July, affected by several factors, one of them a lower discount rate of the central bank, which dropped to .5 percent per month.

Although the latest trends are positive, discussions on serious stabilization could take place only with more solid financial discipline, said Babovic.

FRY: Barter Arrangements Suggested To Access PRC Markets

LD0608184396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1806 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 6 (TANJUG)—The president of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce Assembly and general manager of Grmec Company Rajko Uncanin said Tuesday that barter arrangements were one of the best ways for long-term access of Yugoslav companies to the Chinese market.

Uncanin told TANJUG that barter arrangements would enable Yugoslavia to get the strategic raw material crude oil in exchange for Yugoslav products.

Yugoslav companies have offered to Chinese partners above all finished goods made by industries now working at low capacity, such as metal processing.

Out of the two million tons of crude to be imported from China under the barter arrangement, nearly 600,000 tons have already arrived in Yugoslav refineries, Uncanin said.

The Sinochem company through which the arrangements will be realized is preparing to grant to Chinese partners a credit for importing Yugoslav products, which will also provide funds for Yugoslav manufacturers.

Noting that Chinese customs duties and taxes on Yugoslav products were rather high, Uncanin said that Chinese Government was expected to grant to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the most favored nation status on the basis of reciprocity, which would help promote bilateral economic cooperation.

Yugoslavia's food processing industry has particularly good prospects for cooperation in production through technology transfer and the setting up of baking industries, breweries and other projects.

Grmec is expected to set up shortly a joint project in China for the production of insulation materials and floorings, Uncanin said.

The general manager of the Lola Corporation Dragan Jovacveic told TANJUG that his company had already signed a contract on the export of machine tools to the value of 1.2 million dollars to be purchased by Chinese National Machine Tools Company.

Negotiations are underway on other deals, and Lola expects to sign with Chinese partners two preliminary cooperation ag[illegible]ments on machine manufacture.

The general manager of Teleoptik Company Miroljub Babic told TANJUG that Chinese partners were interested in cooperation in the manufacture of information transmitter sets for measuring devices for motor vehicles.

In line with this barter arrangement, Teleoptik is expected to ship to its partners between 250,000 and 350.000 sets to the value of up to five million dollars.

The assistant general manager of the Rakovica Motor Industry (IMR) Predrag Petrovic said IMR had offered to Chinese partners 3,500 tractors and 10,000 diesel engines for tractors, and has proposed to export also its new model of eco-tractor.

According to figures of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, Chinese partners have so far been offered products to the value of two billion 200 million dinars, mostly from the metal industries.

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Serbia

Serbia: DSS Blames Government for 'Catastrophic' Situation

LD0608170996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1457 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 6 Aug (SRNA)—The Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS] called on the Serbian government today to draw up a social welfare program to prevent hunger among the population.

"July inflation stood at 7 percent, electricity and expenses on public utilities have gone up by 20 percent, bread by 46 percent. All this indicates that the living standard is in drastic decline and that a new inflationary surge can be expected in September," a statement issued by the DSS says.

The DSS believes that the current government is responsible for the catastrophic economic and social situation of Serbia, saying that it is high time something was done immediately.

"The average monthly residential electricity bill will be 200 dinars, 100 dinars will be spent on bread, while pensions and most salaries do not exceed 250 dinars a month," the DSS statement says.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Liberal Party Hails Approval of U.S. Resolution

AU0708115296 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 7 Aug 96 p 5

[Article by F.A.: "The Liberal Party Establishes the Institute for Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prishtina, 6 August—Gjergj Dedaj, chairman of the Liberal Party of Kosova [PLK], stated at the beginning of his news conference today that the recent enigmatic explosions in Prishtina [Pristina] and Podujeve [Podujevo] have provoked fierce violence by Serbian police against innocent people and casual passersby with no warning at all. Serbian police claim to allegedly possess evidence that blames Albanians for the latest blasts, at a time when it is quite known that the Serbian regime is exploiting these incidents for its own internal needs and sometimes for justifying its violence and the presence of the Serbian police and Army in Kosova.

The PLK hails the U.S. Congress's approval of the Resolution on Kosova, which was submitted by Congressman Eliot Engel and was unanimously endorsed. The PLK states that the resolution is at the same time a clear message to Milosevic and the Serbian regime that the Kosova issue is a serious international problem and that the United States will support the expression of the free will of the Kosovar people.

The PLK demands that the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Government immediately and without conditions release Tetovo University Rector Mr. Fadil Sulejmani, University Senate Chairman Mr. Milaim Fejziu, and the other leaders; and urges that Tetovo University be legalized and normalized as soon as possible. Regarding this issue, the PLK recently wrote a letter to Mr. Stojan Andov, chairman of the Liberal Party of Macedonia.

Upon the decision of its presidency, the PLK has recently set up a leading council charged with founding the Institute for Democracy, Dedaj stated. Dedaj confirmed that the priority task of the institute will be to cultivate the values of democracy, tolerance, and political culture. The PLK Institute for Democracy will try to establish direct contacts with similar institutes of its sister liberal parties in Europe and the United States. The majority of the institute's members will mainly be experts in political, social, and judicial sciences and in foreign languages, and not necessarily PLK members. PLK membership in ELDR [expansion unknown] and in the Liberal Internationale in the future necessitates the indispensability of establishing this Institute for Democracy close to the PLK.

Kosovo: U.S. Policy on Province Said 'Advancing'

AU0608203896 Tirana ATA in English 1626 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prishtina, August 6 (ATA)—The statement by U.S. congressman Eliot Angel in Prishtina [Pristina] that "The Albanian people of Kosova are occupied" has been described by political analysts and observers as "a strong sign that U.S. policy towards Kosova is advancing," Information Centre of Kosova reports citing a commentary published in BUJKU paper on August 1.

"The people of Kosova must not lose hope. The U.S. is with them because it has always supported the aspirations for human rights and freedom," said Angel one day after the talks he had in Belgrade with the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

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Such a stand also voiced by other U.S. congressmen and senators is more clearly expressed in the resolution on Kosova which has just been passed by the U. Congress.

This important document has values not only for the content of its demands but also for the moment when it is issued. Of special importance is the demand addressed to the U.S. Administration and President Clinton to appoint a U.S. special envoy for Kosova, which is a step that identifies the U.S. as an international party in the inevitable Albanian-Serbian dialogue on the Kosova question.

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